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iAbstract:	
Recent European proposals to broaden the use of automated border control (ABC) systems for non-
European citizens are expected to lead to a significant increase in such technology.  This Master’s
thesis aims to develop a set of qualitative criteria that can be used for assessing the impacts and
social acceptability of ABC technology.  While quantitative assessments of items such as cost are
relatively easy to ascertain, the qualitative aspects of how a technology impacts on social
participation or the privacy of an individual are much more difficult to assess.  Taking into account
a number of key findings from previous EU-level projects, along with the needs of the current
research, a number of key areas of investigation were outlined.  These included making the criteria
more relevant to the current research, reducing the number of criteria, supporting the criteria with
academic research and dividing the criteria into categories.  Furthermore using a common scale of
measurement, eliminating overlapping criteria where possible, and assessing whether some criteria
could be emphasised as more important than others and assigned a minimum threshold were also
areas to investigate.
The research utilises data from previous EU-level projects, along with other important literature to
define a set of qualitative assessment criteria that can be utilised in combination with quantitative
means such as Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Reduction Assessments.  Using Q Methodology, a
qualitative research method that allows results to be a combination of quantified data and qualitative
interpretation, these criteria were then converted to statements and assessed by 25 stakeholders.  An
online Q Methodology programme was utilised to allow the stakeholders to rank the statements, on
a 9-point scale of perceived importance whereby -4 equalled most unimportant and  +4 most
important.
The results of the research are thus two-fold.  Firstly, they indicate that using such a method to
develop a criteria set is feasible, even though it is difficult to address all of the areas of investigation
satisfactorily.  Secondly, the results of the empirical side of the research reveal three main
groupings of stakeholder perceptions, each of which focuses on slightly different aspects of the
given criteria.  The findings emphasise a need for involving a wide range of stakeholders in any
assessment of technology.  Furthermore, the stakeholder views identified here are shown to be
relevant for understanding the process of performing qualitative assessments of ABC technology.
By combining these qualitative methods with quantitative ones, an interactive approach to
technology assessment has the potential to bring wide benefits.
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List of Terms and Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description
ABC Automated Border Control: A system which allows for an automated border
passage, and which is composed of a self-service system and an e-gate1.
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis
D# Deliverable number (e.g. D3.2) in EU projects
EC / EU European Commission / European Union
EEA European Economic Area
EES Entry Exit System
e-gate Infrastructure operated by electronic means where the effective crossing of an
external border takes place2
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
IA Impact Assessment
P# Participant number (e.g. P1)
PESTL Policy, Ethics, Society, Technology, Legal
QCA Qualitative Criteria Assessment
RRA Risk Reduction Assessment
RRI Responsible Research and Innovation
RTP Registered Traveller Programme
S# Statement number (e.g. S1)
Self-service system An automated system which performs all or some of the border checks that are
applicable to a person3
SIA Social/Societal Impact Assessment
TA Technology Assessment
TCN Third Country National: an individual who is not an EU citizen and does not
enjoy the right to free movement within the EU4
1 European Commission,(2016a, p. 20) European Commission, 2016 (p. 20)
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA 2014a, p. 14)
11. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Recent proposals by the European Commission have noted the potential benefit of automated
border control (ABC) systems for creating a more efficient border crossing experience.  ABC
systems can be described as technology which allows for an automated border passage, and which
is composed of a self-service system for performing tasks such as a passport check, and an e-gate
which controls the act of border crossing.  Although different configurations exist, the e-gate
generally consists of some form of physical barrier, such as twin glass doors, which only open once
the mandated checks have been carried out successfully, or when the traveller is directed to further
checks with a border guard (European Commission 2016a, p. 20).
Although European passport holders have been able to utilise such systems for some time now, the
automation of processes for those carrying passports from countries outside of the European area,
also known as Third-Country Nationals (TCNs), is rather new.  ABC technology thus provides an
opportunity for travellers and border authorities alike.  With traveller flows expected to increase to
887 million external European Union border crossings by 2025 (European Commission 2016b), the
introduction of self-service border control systems has the potential to alleviate the human capital
costs associated with such increases.  By 2020 travellers may be able to perform most, if not all, of
their border crossing checks without direct contact with a border guard due to the increasing
number of individuals possessing electronic passports which contain the holder’s biometric
information, thus allowing an automated system to perform identity verification (International Air
Transport Association 2015b).
Additionally, automation of the border crossing process allows more border guard resources to be
directed away from passport checks towards other security-related tasks such as performing more-
thorough assessments of travellers.  Indeed, so long as the process is adequately supervised by
border authorities, it is not inconceivable that TCN travellers could perform many of their border
crossing tasks without needing to present themselves to a border guard (European Commission
2016c).  Automated checks using biometric identifiers such as facial images and fingerprints also
have the potential to contribute to security, enabling the proper identification of legitimate
document owners, and the detection of imposters.
What is new here then is the proposal to broaden the usage of ABC systems for border crossing, and
the creation of a centralised database to store the entry and exit information of TCN travellers.
However, concerns exist about the connection of such technology to European-wide databases, such
2as the EES which gathers data for the purposes of identifying the length of stay within the EU for
TCN travellers (Bigo et al. 2012; De Hert 2013).  Such data collection is justified by the European
Commission (EC) as essential to modernise the EU’s borders, to help create a more efficient border
crossing process in light of projected increases in traveller flows, to identify those who over-stay
their visa period, and to bolster internal security and the fight against terrorism and serious crime
(European Commission 2016c).
ABC technologies can thus be comprised of multiple components such as electronic barriers or
gates; surveillance cameras; document readers; biometric capture devices such as fingerprint
scanners, facial image cameras, iris scanners; information displays; hardware-and software for
system management; as well as numerous sensors performing a multitude of tasks (Frontex 2015a,
pp. 22, 6).  These components individually might raise issues with those who perform impact
assessments, but when in combination the effects are compounded (Atos 2013; European
Commission 2014b, p. 33).
1.2 Aim and research questions
Due to this growing focus on implementing new border control technology within the EU, there is
an increased importance on assessing the impacts such technologies might have on the individuals
who interact with them.  The FastPass (2013b) project is funded under the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) and aims to establish and demonstrate a
harmonized, modular approach for ABC gates.
This research contributes to the FastPass project by developing a set of qualitative criteria useful in
assessing the social impacts and acceptability of ABC technology.  In this sense, it contributes to
the FastPass goal of harmonisation by proposing a method of harmonising the social and
technological aspects of ABC systems through qualitative impact assessment.  It will do so by
utilising data from previous EU-level projects that aimed to perform similar tasks for policy
decisions and security-technology decisions.  While these previous projects focused on support in
the decision-making process of security policy, this current research will focus on creating a criteria
set which will contribute towards a decision-support tool for technology decisions such as for
border control technology.  The focus therefore is on border control technology in general and ABC
technology specifically.
3The first research question, which addresses the development of a set of qualitative criteria, can thus
be formulated as:
(1) What are the important criteria to include in an impact assessment of ABC technology?
The thesis thus develops a “truncated” form of impact assessment which explores only qualitative
impacts, that is questions regarding who and what is affected, in what ways, and why.  This can be
contrasted with asking quantitative questions such as those dealing with costs and values.  However,
it is important to be able to link the two forms of investigation, both quantitative and qualitative, in
order to gather a more accurate picture of the impacts of a project, programme or policy.
Thus this set of qualitative criteria is intended as only one part of a three-part toolset composed of a
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), a Risk Reduction Assessment (RRA) and a Qualitative Criteria
Assessment (QCA) as in the ValueSec project (2013) which aimed to develop a decision support
tool for policy decision-makers.  The first two components are inherently quantitative, while the
latter is qualitative in nature.  Utilising this concept of a three-pronged decision-support toolset, the
current research aims to develop a set of qualitative criteria that are targeted at assessing the less-
quantifiable impact of ABC technologies through qualitative interpretation of quantified data.
In order to address the first research question, a number of key issues first need to be considered.
The first relates to ensuring the number of criteria is manageable.  Secondly, the selected criteria
should be justified using academic literature, or other documents of an official nature in order to
show why they are important.  Third, the new, concise set of criteria should be divided into
categories to aid in the assessment process.  Fourth, the criteria should be given a common scale of
measurement so that all can be assessed at the same time and in the same way.  Fifth, criteria which
overlap with others should be reduced or otherwise accounted for.  Sixth, the possibility of
assigning a special status to certain criteria should be examined.  These criteria would thus be
assigned a minimum threshold value, which, if not reached, would terminate the assessment
process.  However, it must be stressed that the research does not aim to solve these issues, but rather
investigate how they can best be addressed in relation to the research question.  These issues are
mainly addressed through the chosen research method, Q Methodology (Q), which is utilised to
translate qualitative questioning and responses into a combination of qualitative and quantitative
data.
In this research, Q is utilised as a research tool which supports the basic aims of this thesis.  The
steps involved in preparing and performing the Q research also overlap with the aims noted above.
For example, one of the first tasks to perform in Q is to identify the relevant discourse on a topic in
4order to develop statements which can later be ranked by research participants.  This process of
identifying literature ensures only relevant information is included, while also helping the research
reduce unnecessary criteria.
Furthermore, by testing this set of criteria amongst stakeholders, the research aims to reveal the
areas on which certain stakeholders place emphasis, and indeed whether stakeholders share certain
views.  Such results are important contributions when attempting to understand which stakeholders
might object to certain aspects of the technology, thus allowing for a more inclusive and negotiated
process.
The second research question can thus be formulated as:
(2) Do stakeholders differ in their perceptions of the subjective importance of the criteria?
In this research Q supports this stage by allowing stakeholders to rank the criteria according to how
important, or unimportant they perceive the criteria to be.  The end result being groupings of like-
minded participants, and data demonstrating what each group emphasised over the others, what was
common amongst all, and importantly for this research, the rank assigned to individual criteria by
each group
Therefore this thesis presents two separate sets of results: firstly, those which describe how the six
methodological issues were dealt with in the research, and secondly the final results of the Q
process.  The former are findings or recommendations relating to methodology (research question
one).  The latter are perhaps the more interesting for the FastPass project, and hint to three major
perspectives among the participants of what is important to assess when considering ABC
technology implementation.  These perspectives, otherwise known as Factors in Q, are roughly
described as Technologists, Humanists and Concerned Pragmatists.
The findings of this research contribute to a better understanding of what issues are important to
consider when performing assessments of ABC technology.  Indeed, while this thesis is specifically
focused on ABC, there is no reason why the basic principles could not be extended to other similar
technologies with some minor modifications.  Understanding the perspectives of relevant
stakeholder groups is essential when performing technology assessments and this research
contributes to this understanding by revealing three such perspectives.  It must be emphasised that
these are not the only possible perspectives; they are just three of a currently unknown number.  The
research thus contributes to a better understanding of these three groupings by showing which
criteria they emphasise, and which they do not.  Knowing this is essential information when
performing future assessments to ensure that minority views are also represented.
51.3 Structure of the thesis
After this first introductory chapter, the second section of this thesis begins by outlining the
background of the research, noting the importance of previous projects in the area.  It continues by
introducing recent proposals by the European Commission to establish an Entry/Exit System, which
would enable the greater use of ABC technology for crossing borders, whether those be in airports,
seaports, or at rail crossings or land crossings.  The discussion then moves into the social impacts of
such technology before finishing with an introduction to common methods of impact assessment.
The third section of this thesis begins with an introduction of Q methodology.  It continues by
elaborating on the method used to conduct this research, explaining how a number of the research
areas noted above were addressed.  This section explains the usefulness of Q for the current
research purposes, hinting at the overlaps that exist in preparing the research and the aims of the
thesis.  The third section describes how the statements were selected and constructed, how the
participants were chosen, and how the research was performed using an online programme designed
for Q tasks.  This section also describes how the criteria were categorised.  Tasks performed by the
participants are also described in detail in this chapter.
The fourth section of this thesis discusses the results of the research process.  It begins with an
explanation of how the data was analysed and introduces the main participant data.  This section
describes how the participants’ results were broken down and arranged in order to identify
commonalities described as factors.  The three factors identified are described, including details of
the statements which the participants ranked positively, and those that they ranked negatively.
Statements that were ranked similarly across all three factors are also described, together with a
discussion about the implications of such rankings.  The discussion then moves on to discussing the
research results relating to the key issues not covered in the methodology section: an assessment of
the scale of measurement, overlapping criteria and “killer criteria”.  The section then concludes with
some discussion about the role of Q methodology in producing the desired results for the current
and ongoing research, before giving a number of recommendations.
The final section of the thesis offers a discussion on the research objectives and gives an analysis of
the overall findings before offering a number of final conclusions.
62. Background and literature review
The following sections introduce the aims and concept of the research before delving deeper into
the important literature in regards to the project.  The literature review is not necessarily a compare
and contrast exercise, or an attempt to ascertain if one particular theory is better than another.  In
this research theoretical underpinnings of methods are not examined in detail, it is much more
practical in nature.  Indeed, the literature review reveals that much of the field surrounding this area
of research is not only theoretical, but also, and more importantly, practical.  This research is
empirical in nature, and therefore much of the literature utilised is also of such a nature.
What this research does approach, however broadly, is the potential impact that policy, through the
implementation of technology, may have on individuals and society.  In an effort to minimise these
potential impacts, this thesis attempts to firstly identify them, and then measure to what extent
relevant stakeholders consider them important.  The issue of European policy on border control is
fundamentally grounded in discussions related to studies in International Relations.  Furthermore,
the topic at hand is extremely relevant to modern peace and conflict studies, especially those
dealing with securitization, bordering, and the impacts of surveillance technology on the citizen (see
for example Bigo et al. 2012; Burgess 2008b, 2012).  The border control process is inherently
discriminatory, that is, the purpose of performing the task is to ascertain who is, and who is not,
allowed to cross certain spaces.  How we define who is and who is not allowed to cross borders
generally relies on a number of assumptions about the meaning of concepts such as what constitutes
identity, nationality, the state, and internal and external security (see for example the discussions in
Albert, Jacobson & Lapid 2001).  Yet it is something which is expected for much international
travel in the modern era, with few exceptions, such as that of the Schengen area in the European
Union.  The following sections introduce such topics, although not from their usual perspective.
There are many issues and concepts such as security, ethics, risk, individual perception,
technological processes, law and so forth, in this thesis that could be discussed ad nauseum.
However, limitations on time and content, and the researcher’s desire to refrain from such multi-
faceted theoretical discussions in order to focus on the pragmatic mean that these conversations are
left to others.
2.1 Background
As predictions that the number of travellers entering the EU is set to dramatically increase over the
coming years, the effects this will have on the European Union’s external borders is under
increasing scrutiny.  An official memo from the European Commission notes that border crossings
7are expected to increase dramatically by 2030 (European Commission 2013).  Add to this current
economic troubles, security concerns and a push towards greater efficiency and it is no wonder
certain security technology industries are expecting large revenue increases over the next 15 years
(European Commission 2014b, p. 31).  Due to this expected increase in travellers, and in an effort
to manage border crossings in a more efficient manner, there has been a push towards automated
border control (ABC) systems.  These systems and the policy behind them are discussed in more
detail below, for now it is simply worth noting this move towards automation.
This research is based on concepts developed in previous European Union-funded projects such as
ValueSec (2013) and DESSI (Čas & Kaufmann 2012) which sought to develop decision-support
tools for security, and policy decision-makers respectively.  The ValueSec toolset consisted of three
main parts, a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Risk Reduction Assessment (RRA) and a Qualitative
Criteria Assessment (QCA).  The latter is what this research concerns itself with, but nevertheless a
brief introduction of the other two will help form a sound understanding of the task at hand.
CBA in essence, compares the costs of implementing (or not implementing) technology change
with the benefits that that implementation may bring.  In summary it “enables the decision maker to
compare all direct and indirect positive and negative effects of the proposed decisions on an
objective basis” (Pérez & Machnicki 2013a, p. 115).  RRA on the other hand, looks at current risks
and how these could be mitigated through technology implementation: “a level of risk is analysed
for a situation as-is, i.e. without the implementation of a …measure, and compared to a
situation/alternative situations, in which [the] measure was implemented” (Pérez & Machnicki
2013a, p. 28).
What is also needed here is a qualitative perspective.  For example, neither a CBA nor RRA usually
contain an analysis of whether the technology is ethically and socially acceptable, nor would they
answer the question about what the end users of the technology actually think about using it.  For
example they could not necessarily answer what end user’s concerns are, whether they think it is
safe, respects dignity, or could potentially be used for purposes other than for which it was
designed.  In essence, the questions that QCA aims to address are the “soft criteria”, that is, the
human or ethical aspects of the technology: how we feel about it, how it makes us feel, and how
that might change the way we interact with each other.
8Figure 1: Illustration of the three components of the decision-support toolset.  The QCA component is examined in this
research.
These three tools (CBA, RRA, QCA) together make up the toolset for a decision-support tool (see
Figure 1 above).  This research focuses only on the QCA component of the toolset.  While the
overarching aims of the ValueSec project were to provide transparency and support in the decision-
making process of security policy, this current research will focus on creating a criteria set which
will contribute towards a decision-support tool for technology decisions, specifically ABC
technology.
The ValueSec project developed a tool which combined the inputs from CBA, RRA and QCA in
order to support policy decisions.  The DESSI criteria set was developed for similar purposes,
although without the input from CBA and RRA, and the main focus was security investment
decisions.  The former criteria numbered close to 100, while the latter numbered 46.
The current research therefore utilises the previous findings of these projects to develop a set of
criteria to use in QCA aimed specifically at assessing ABC technology.  Thus this research does not
specifically take into account issues of risk assessment or analysing cost-benefits which are deemed
outside of the focus of QCA, although as will be shown, there are a number of potential overlaps
identified.
A security-related example of the importance of assessing technology for public use is the
implementation of airport security scanners.  The scanners in question utilized backscatter or
millimetre wave technology and displayed a real-time image of the individual inside the device that
was so life-like that the devices came to be known as “nude” or “naked” body scanners (Hempel et
Cost-Benefit Analysis
(CBA)
Compares costs
against benefits of
implementation
options.
Quantitative
Risk Reduction
Assessment (RRA):
Identifies and attempts
to minimise or mitigate
risks by assessing
different options.
Quantitative
Qualitative Criteria
Assessment (QCA):
Assesses how
individuals and
society feel about the
proposed technology.
The human aspect of
implementation
Qualitative
Toolset
9al. 2013, p. 741; Kravets 2011).  Indeed traveller backlash in America against the idea of airport
security screeners being able to view these ‘invasive’ images of travellers ultimately led to some
machines being removed and procurement contracts being cancelled. However, other versions of
the same technology were able to remain in use as the passenger was represented on the security
screener’s display by an avatar rather than a live image (Nixon 2013).  Furthermore, researchers
have claimed that such scanners are not as effective at identifying security threats as previously
thought (Mowery et al. 2014).
Image 1: Before (left) and after passenger representation was changed on backscatter scanner5
This brief example demonstrates the costs involved in not assessing the social impacts of
technology implementation.  While the implementation of such devices may technically be legal, as
noted by Hempel and Lammerant (2015, p. 37) “an impact on a freedom which is considered legal
can still be considered annoying by a traveller and therefore minimizing it can be important in order
to improve acceptance.”  In this case, a much smoother implementation may have occurred had
stakeholders such as travellers and their representatives, as well as external experts been more
thoroughly consulted in the design and implementation process of this technology.
5 Image source: (AP Photo/Transportation Security Administration) http://www.timesunion.com/business/article/Some-
airport-scanners-out-3982805.php
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2.2 Increasing the use of technology at the border
The use of automated border technology is a rising trend across the world.  A recent publication by
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2015b) notes that three billion travellers were
transported by the aviation industry alone in 2015, and that this number is expected to double in the
next 15 to 20 years.  This is supported by an official memo from the European Commission notes
that border crossings are expected to increase by 80% on 2009 numbers by the year 2030 (European
Commission 2013). Thus in an effort to increase security and efficiency in border control
procedures, Automated Border Control (ABC) systems are expected to bring benefits of faster and
smoother passenger flows without the need for an increase in border guards relative to passenger
flows (International Air Transport Association 2015b).  An ABC typically consists of a self-service
module which the traveller utilises to perform tasks such as submitting passport information
through a document reader and biometric (such as fingerprint or facial image) data using scanners
or cameras, and an e-gate which controls the border crossing process (European Commission
2016a, p. 20).  It is useful to note that these two parts of an ABC may be integrated as in Image 2
(FastPass 2013a) below, or it may consist of a separate, stand-alone kiosk for the self-service steps,
with the e-gate being located a short distance away (see for example Frontex 2015a, p. 41).  This
can be contrasted to a “manual” process, where the traveller presents her/himself to a border guard
who performs relevant checks on identity and eligibility to cross the border.  These tasks are usually
performed with the aid of computer systems connected to national and European databases,
document readers, and biometric capture devices such as cameras and fingerprint scanners.  The
location, configuration and type of ABC systems utilised at a border crossing point will depend on
the type of border.  In general there are four main border crossing types or ports: air, sea, road and
rail, and configurations must be arranged according to the space available, and the environment in
which they will operate (Frontex 2015a, pp. 40-3).
Travellers can make use of these systems, which allow a smaller number of border guards to
monitor and process a larger number of travellers, thus freeing up other border guards for essential
duties.  This does not mean that the border guard role is becoming obsolete, on the contrary, it has
been argued that ABC systems enhance security in general as border guards are now able to focus
on other potentially higher-risk travellers (International Air Transport Association 2015b).  The
issue of risk in terms of border crossings is a contested one as the subjectivity and terminology of
who and what constitutes risk is continually debated (see for example Bigo et al. 2012; Burgess
2008a, 2008b).  However, my intention here is not to delve into such complex topics, but rather to
note that such classifications are used when discussing border crossing (see FRA 2014a, p. 20).  In
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this way, the greatest benefit of ABC systems would go to low-risk frequent travellers, airports, and
border control agencies, however the discussion below looks at some of these issues in relation to
the European Union’s Smart Borders proposal.
Image 2: An example of an integrated ABC workflow6
The European Union’s 2016 “Smart Borders” (SB) proposal envisages a modernised border
management procedure through automated border checks and improved entry and exit information
regarding non-European passport holders (European Commission 2016c, 2016d).  It is similar in
many respects to a previous proposal in 2013, except for the elimination of the Registered Traveller
Programme (RTP) (European Commission 2013; European Parliament 2016).  ABC systems allow
the electronic stamping of passports of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) when they enter or exit the
external borders of Schengen member states through a system known as the Entry/Exit System (or
EES). It would also allow travellers—providing they hold a biometric or ‘e-passport’ to perform
border control checks using ABC systems which, at the moment, are generally7 reserved for
European Union (EU), European Economic Area (EEA) and Swiss (CH) biometric passport
holders.  The newest proposal recommends that TCNs be able to perform a “pre-check” process at a
6 Image used with permission, sourced from FastPass (2013a).
7 Some ABC system implementers such as Helsinki-Vantaa Airport also allow specific TCN passport holders to utilize
the automated passport control; however, manual passport stamping is usually performed by a border guard
immediately after exiting the ABC.  See for example, https://www.finavia.fi/en/helsinki-
airport/terminals/border_control/
Image © AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH
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stand-alone kiosk, before moving on to a manual process where their data is checked to ensure
authenticity (European Commission 2016a, pp. 27-8).  Additionally, when automated exit gates (e-
gates) are available, the proposal seems to make allowance for their use by TCNs, providing they
are adequately supervised, and the pre-check process has already been performed for those who do
not hold residence permits, cards, or other long-term visas (European Commission 2016a, pp. 24-7,
9-30).  Furthermore, the proposal also retains the possibility of Member States enacting their own
RTPs for pre-vetted frequent travellers, which might allow TCNs to utilise ABC systems without
performing pre-checks on every entry.  Thus the move towards greater automation of border control
systems is argued to benefit not only EU/EEA/CH passport holders, but also TCN passport holders.
This has the potential to massively increase the number of ABC systems in use in ports and borders
around the European Union.  However, it seems too early to say exactly how many member states
will implement such systems, as the proposal, if passed in its current form, will only come into
force in 2020.
In essence, the SB proposal is in response to predictions that the number of travellers entering the
EU is set to dramatically increase over the coming years.  Put succinctly, in order to deal with this
expected increase in traveller flows, the latest SB proposal notes that: “The proposed Entry-Exit
System will allow for the effective management of authorised short-stays, increased automation at
border-controls, and improved detection of document and identity fraud” (European Commission
2016d).
Thus at both entry and exit the data of TCNs such as name, travel document information, date and
time of entry/exit, and biometrics such as face and fingerprints will be recorded and stored in order
to perform verification of identity and duration of stay (European Commission 2016c).  The new
proposal also provides for member states to be alerted when an individual has stayed longer than
their allowed duration (European Commission 2016b, p. 11 Article 1). On the other hand some
critics of the former proposal, which did not allow for such notification, argued that overstays could
only be detected once an individual attempted to exit (or re-enter) the Schengen area, as this is the
point when the time-stamps are compared and duration of stay calculated (Bigo et al. 2012, p. 33).
However, it should be noted here that in this author’s interpretation, the EES system will only alert
member states when an overstay occurs.  Thus it may still be the case that even though those who
overstay are identified through these EES alerts, they will not necessarily be apprehended until they
either attempt to cross a controlled border, or come into contact with authorities through other
methods.
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Furthermore, the current proposal will also require Third Country Nationals (TCNs) not subject to
visa requirements to submit biometric data in order to enrol in the EES (European Commission
2016a, p. 28).  Despite reassurances that such a system will be safeguarded and overseen to ensure
privacy and data protection, data protection and rights organisations such as EDRi (Naranjo 2015)
have argued that the 2013 proposal failed to meet the tests of whether it is necessary, proportional,
or effective.  As yet, the newest proposal has not received such criticism, but it is still early days.
The European Commission (2013) argued for the original proposal on grounds of long-term
efficiencies and cost saving-the investment was expected to save up to 250 million Euros per year.
These savings were to be achieved through reducing the number of border resources needed, along
with an increase of automated technologies such as ABCs.  The most recent proposal has a more
modest budget: since dropping the RTP, the expected costs have more than halved to 480 Million
Euros, however there is no clarification if the initial estimate of 250 million Euros per year is still
valid (European Commission 2016c).  The reduced costs of the new proposal, along with the
proposed wide-spread usage of ABC systems for pre-checking may even allay common concerns
about ABC systems in general-that the cost of the systems, along with a lack of data on the benefits,
low passenger volumes, and legislation makes their implementation unattractive (International Air
Transport Association 2015a).
One could, and many have, argued that the ongoing securitization of Europe’s borders involves not
only security from a political perspective, but also from an economic perspective (Chalfin 2012;
Wright et al. 2014).  With implementation of the SB proposal, along with other border technologies
aimed at tackling illegal migration, the winners appear to be not only the citizens of Europe, but
also (and perhaps mostly) defence and security industry contractors (Boulanin & Bellais 2014;
Proctor 2015).  This is an interesting development, as the EC itself has previously noted the societal
challenges which new security technologies raise, including negative consequences, societal
conflicts and loss of investments (Hempel et al. 2013, p. 741).  An EC opinion paper (European
Commission 2014b) notes that some technologies in the area of security and surveillance, such as
surveillance systems (CCTV) seem to be looking for problems to solve, rather than responding to a
genuine need.  This brings to mind the questions of proportionality and necessity mentioned earlier.
A warning from Burgess (2008a) also notes that technological solutions to security must address the
human at the centre of the security-insecurity intersect or else risk being self-defeating.  Security
technology then, along with the discourse and policies that surround it, may very well create
insecurity in the sense that they heighten fear and uncertainty (Burgess 2012; Kreissl 2014, p. 660).
Once fear and uncertainty are increased, it is easy to attempt to reduce these with technological
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solutions, thus setting in motion a vicious cycle.  Of importance in this discussion, therefore, are
questions of privacy, security, social cohesion, conflict and unintended consequences of
technological innovation in border management.
The increasing number of security-related technologies also raises the concern that EU citizens
could come under increased surveillance.  Bigo et al. (2012, p. 34) raised this concern in their paper
in 2012, and in late 2015 there was indeed a proposal tabled to enforce mandatory entry and exit
database checks at Schengen borders for EU citizens (European Commission 2015c).  Indeed, the
issue of privacy is perhaps one of the biggest concerns in the area of border management, especially
when biometric information is involved (Campisi 2013b).  Others argue that biometric data is some
of the most sensitive data about an individual which could be processed as it involves uniquely
identifying an individual, and thus it is important that Data Protection Impact Assessments are
undertaken (Dmitrova 2016).  The issues of how technologies collect, store and transmit
information is the subject of EU data protection regulations (European Commission 2012b) and
thus is enshrined in law.  However, the EC also encourages technology developers to actively
engage society in research and innovation, promoting systems that utilise a ‘privacy by design’
method, that is, prioritising privacy throughout the entire design process (European Commission
2012a).  The same document also commits the EC to make societal impact testing an obligatory part
of all its future security research projects (European Commission 2012a, p. 11).  This might be
easier said than done, as while technology is under development, it is difficult to predict and control
the negative impacts it might produce, however, once the technology is implemented and there is
enough data to demonstrate the impacts, it may be costly and slow to control these impacts (Sollie
& Düwell 2009a, p. 2).  This leads back to issues of uncertainty, and the unpredictable, unforeseen
and unanticipated nature of complex technology development trajectories discussed earlier.
It should be noted however, that the implementer of a technology, in this case a national border
authority, will often describe their needs and requirements to the technology developer (Frontex
2012a, pp. 29,32, 55, 2012b, pp. 14, 37).  While these requirements must comply with relevant EU
and national regulations on privacy, data protection and the like, the specific requirements of the
implementer may involve a combination of technology interactions which are outside of the control
of the developer.  In this sense, an ABC gate may be combined with existing IT systems, or
databases controlled by a third party (Kamara et al. 2015).  All this is to say that despite the fact the
ABC developer may operate by a privacy by design principle, when the technology is implemented,
specific end-user requirements may require it to operate, or interact with other technologies that do
not- or have not been designed to- adhere to this principle.  This could create the situation where a
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‘black box’ is inherited, that is, a closed system which the implementers have little or no
understanding of how it functions (Sollie 2009b, p. 146).  Thus there is a need to not only look at
the individual technologies, but also how they are combined to form systems.  This is where impact
assessments come into play, but first an introduction to the policy environment is in order.
Policy at a European level has led to an ever-increasing digitalisation of Europe’s borders.  Systems
such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS), and EURODAC
(the EU database for identifying asylum-seekers and ensuring the proper implementation of the
Dublin Regulation) are now routinely utilised by law enforcement agencies, despite the fact that
some are now being used beyond their original purpose (De Hert 2013, p. 387; Gonzales Fuster &
Gutwirth 2011).  This is a fundamental element of what is referred to as “function creep” and is
seen as a major threat to privacy and project legitimacy.  Function creep occurs when the scope of
use of a technology (or the data collected by the technology) is gradually expanded beyond the
original statement of purpose, which ultimately leads to privacy loss (Bigo et al. 2012, p. 46;
Campisi 2013a, p. vi; De Hert 2013, p. 390).  Such gradual, or incremental changes often take place
quietly, unobtrusively and as an administrative convenience, yet the human consequences are
generally unknown, ignored or downplayed (Ball et al. 2006).  Function creep was introduced here
as an example of how policy may have unintended consequences on society leading to ever-
increasing securitization, and is another factor to add to the list of impacts given above, namely
privacy, security, and social cohesion.
While this all seems doom and gloom, it is also essential to note that the EU also actively funds
projects that aim at reducing the impact of such security technologies mentioned here.  In fact,
some argue that in the past there has been a strong focus in most of the EU funded projects in
security foresight on the dangers and negative effects of such technologies, rather than their benefits
(Burgess 2014).  Furthermore, there are EU agencies such as the European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights (FRA) which regularly produce papers analysing, for example, the situation at
certain external border crossing points (FRA 2014a, 2014b).  The following sections begin by
examining the tools available to identify and mitigate negative technological impacts as best as
possible, it is in no way an exhaustive list, but the main tools of relevance to this study are included.
The section then continues with further examination of how these tools are utilised in the European
projects in the area of impact and technology assessment.
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2.3 Impact Assessments
Rapid advances in technology have often forced change upon people and societies without an
adequate assessment of harms and benefits, impacts on social and cultural values, and whether or
not these changes are even desired or needed, and if so, by whom (Nissenbaum 2010, p. 161).  The
QCA method which this research focuses on has similar objectives to those Nissenbaum discusses
above (Blobner 2013b, pp. 44-5; Kaufmann 2012, p. 30), however, much of the work of assessing
impacts of policies, projects or programmes is attributed by another name, Impact Assessment.
Impact Assessments (IA) have been common in some shape or form since the mid-1970s, whereby
they were usually encountered in the form of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), which also
may have included some form of Social Impact Assessment (SIA) (Baines, Taylor & Vanclay 2013,
p. 255; Esteves, Franks & Vanclay 2012, p. 34; Vanclay 2015, p. iv).  SIA is broadly described as
“analysing, monitoring and managing the social consequences of development” (Vanclay 2003, p.
6).  However, these early SIAs were usually of limited scope and did not take into account broader
social issues.  Indeed, it was eventually realised that broader social issues other than simply
biophysical ones relating to EIAs were also of importance and deserved to be assessed in their own
right (Vanclay 2015, p. iv).  The field of SIAs thus emerged in its own right in order to assess how
society was affected by the implementation of policy.  Writing in a document titled ‘Guidance for
Assessing and Managing the Social Impacts of Projects’ Vanclay (2015, p. 2) notes that there are a
number of important differences between EIAs and SIAs: notably that while environmental impacts
usually only occur at the sod-breaking stage of a project, social impacts may occur at the first
rumour of a proposed project.  This tends to make SIAs far more complex than EIAs, as many more
factors need to be taken into consideration.
Esteves et al. note that there are some broad fundamentals to performing ‘good’ SIA, namely that:
it is participatory; supports affected peoples, proponents, regulatory and support agencies;
increases their understanding of how change comes about and increases their capacities to
respond to change; and has a broad understanding of social impacts  (2012, p. 40).
Thus, SIAs are designed to help not only implementers of policy, but also those who will be
affected by the policy implementation.  It is a process which may occur from the inception of a
project or policy, through the research, development, and implementation phases onwards to assess
the ongoing impacts (Prainsack & Ostermeier 2013, p. 6).  Therefore, SIA is an ongoing process; it
is something that involves monitoring and managing as noted by Vanclay (2003) above.  Thus, it
differs slightly from other forms of impact assessment in terms of its scope and duration.
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Related to SIAs are what is called a Surveillance Impact Assessment (Ball et al. 2006, p. 85).
Surveillance IA is noted to include an examination of the impacts of surveillance on a range of
issues that includes, but also transcends privacy.  However, when compared with SIA, Surveillance
IA scopes a slightly narrower range of issues, impacts and stakeholders, with a focus on the
societal impacts of surveillance (Hempel & Lammerant 2015), rather than SIA’s focus on impacts
of the technology as a whole (Wright & Raab 2012).  Thus, the Surveillance IA includes normative
and regulatory questions of surveillance, but also incorporates questions of issues and impacts
similar to those of SIAs.
Another form of assessment that is generally encompassed in an SIA and a possibly also
Surveillance IA, but may also occur independently, is a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA).  These
assessments analyse the impact a policy, program, plan or project has at a privacy level by
identifying and evaluating privacy risks, checking compliance to privacy legislation, and
considering how risks can be avoided or mitigated (Hempel et al. 2013).  These risks might be
directed at the individual or societal level.  Compared to SIAs then, PIAs have a much narrower
scope that is usually defined by specific legal frameworks and discourses surrounding data
protection (Hempel et al. 2013, p. 743).
Technology Assessments (TA) are applied processes that consider the implications which
technological change has on society (Russell, Vanclay & Aslin 2010, p. 113).  TAs can come in a
number of forms, but the most relevant to this discussion is Constructive TA (CTA). CTA is a
method which aims at including important stakeholders from the earliest stages of the design
process, and that the development of technology is influenced by interests and values of all
individuals who participate in its design (Schot 2001).  Participatory TAs are often seen as
normative judgements, however, it is important to realise that while TAs may provide expertise to
underpin judgement, they do not make these judgements themselves (Russell, Vanclay & Aslin
2010, p. 110).  TAs should recognise that normative judgements are political actions, and thus
should be left to political actors: the role of TAs should be seen as more providing clearer pictures
of social context and changes on the societal level that occur with the associated technology.  Thus
TA should inform discussions and decisions about technological changes and about social futures
associated with them (Russell, Vanclay & Aslin 2010, p. 113).  Improving the understanding of the
social context of technology will not always result in ‘better’ decision-making, but it should reveal
the underlying political and ideological rationale for decisions.  This in turn should lead to increased
transparency and accountability, in the decision-making process.
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Assessments such as those listed above are often viewed as devices aimed at bringing rationality to
decision making processes.  However, it is also important to understand that each of these processes
is influenced by how, and by whom differing definitions are made (Hempel & Lammerant 2015).
This is because there are also inherent premises, assumptions and limitations of such assessments,
and thus it is important that these are also identified (Abrahamsen et al. 2015; Russell, Vanclay &
Aslin 2010; Schot 2001).  Impact assessments are generally seen as early warning systems and often
follow basic risk assessment procedures; however, defining ‘risk’ is a process involving moral
judgements, involving social and culturally constructed ways of looking at the world (Hempel &
Lammerant 2015, pp. 129-30; Kreissl 2014, p. 660).  Impact assessments therefore involve
inherently moral decision-making processes, and as such have become more common when
assessing social issues surrounding development projects.  Such impact assessments are not ‘magic
bullets’ which will transform a bad technology into a better one, neither should they simply be used
as ‘tick box’ exercises to gain approvals or certifications for a project (Ball et al. 2006, p. 92).
Rather, the decisions about policy or projects made by the select few individuals should be analysed
to ascertain their impact as these decisions hold the potential to affect broad collectives of people
who are impacted on many levels, by technological systems development. In short, human decisions
impact technological development, technological development shapes societal values, and societal
values impact human decisions in an iterative and ongoing fashion (Carew & Stapleton 2014, p.
150).
Additionally, Verbeek (2009) argues that because technologies shape the moral actions of human
beings, thus designers should consider their responsibility for the moral dimension of their designs.
Thus such assessments have also come to be associated with ethical research and policy
implementation (Baines, Taylor & Vanclay 2013; Vanclay, Baines & Taylor 2013).  Thus using
morals and ethics as a base, IAs (and SIAs in particular) attempt to create an environment where
both the intended and unintended social impacts -which might be positive or negative – of planned
interventions can be adequately identified, analysed, monitored and managed (Schot 2001, p. 44).
The goal of these processes is to bring about a sustainable and equitable result for both the human
and biophysical environment (Vanclay 2003, p. 6).  In this sense IAs are also somewhat related to
the concept of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) which aims at a transparent and
interactive innovation process which includes consideration of the ethical acceptability,
sustainability and social desirability of innovative technologies (Owen, Macnaghten & Stilgoe
2012).  The EU has adopted such an approach as part of its Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
for Research and Innovation noting that RRI is a process which aligns research and innovation
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processes and outcomes with the values, needs and expectations of society (European Commission
2015b).  To summarize this, the aim is to reduce the future effects of technology by engaging users,
stakeholders, and other citizens in the technology design process.  This allows for pre-emptive
identification of potential issues in the design process, rather than a reactionary problem solving
approach post-implementation which must rely on feedback from (usually negative) market signals
and social effects (Schot 2001, p. 43).
This brief introduction to the different forms of Impact Assessments and Technology Assessments
directs us to how these tools are utilised or discussed at relevant policy-making levels within
Europe.  To begin with the European Commission’s (2009b) Impact Assessment Guidelines detail
the importance of IA in ensuring Commission initiatives and EU legislation are undertaken in a
transparent and effective manner.  The guidelines include a section which specifically details the
relevant areas an impact assessment should focus on, which are split into three main tables:
economic, social, and environmental impacts (European Commission 2009b, pp. 33-8).  It is
important to emphasise, however, that these guidelines are designed to help at an EU policy-level,
that is, not everything is necessarily applicable to the current research.  Even so, they are a relevant
reference point to determine what the important aspects of IA are, and as such are generally utilised
by EU-level projects.
There are a number of EU-level projects that have utilised and furthered research in the field of
Impact Assessment.  For example, the DESSI project developed a set of criteria that were used as
input into a tool designed to provide support for security decisions (Čas & Kaufmann 2012).  The
system of criteria from the DESSI project were also utilised in a later project called CRISP in its
aims to develop “a robust methodology for security product certification” in Europe (CRISP 2014;
Kamara et al. 2015, pp. 18-26).  Another project, SIAM (2011) aimed at creating a decision support
system for security technology investments and developed an approach that was also later utilised
by CRISP (2014).  The ValueSec (2013) project also aimed to develop a toolset, but this time to
support policy decision-makers.  The PACT Project (Atos 2013) aimed to develop a framework
with the purpose of supporting decision-makers at the policy, design and development levels to
enable security technology decisions in a transparent and rational manner.  The PRISE project
(PRISE 2009) also identified criteria that could be utilised for the assessment of privacy and
security technologies and utilised PIA in their work.  Meanwhile the SAPIENT Project (2011),
which aimed to develop a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) framework for surveillance
technologies (Wright & Raab 2012, p. 614).
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It is also worth noting that some of the individuals involved with a number of these EU projects are
also experts who produce ‘state of the art’ literature in the field.  It is a very ‘hands-on’ field where
the experts actively participate in EU funded projects in these areas.  For example, Wright and Raab
co-authored a paper in 2012 on surveillance impact assessments, Wright was also involved in the
SAPIENT (2011) and ASSERT (2013) projects, and Raab was a co-author on the Surveillance
Society report to the Information Commissioner of the United Kingdom (Ball et al. 2006).  Leon
Hempel (Hempel & Lammerant 2015; Hempel et al. 2013) was involved in the SIAM, ASSERT,
and CRISP projects (CRISP 2014; SIAM 2011).  Thus, the experts are heavily involved in past and
ongoing EU-level projects regarding the areas of impact assessments.
2.4 Relevance to current research
In this vein, the current research aims to use qualitative methods to develop a framework for
identifying potential issues relating to border control technology.  In no way does this research
attempt to create an “ethics of technology” in the sense which Sollie and Düwell (2009b) request,
but it attempts to create a framework which will assess the impact a technology may have on
society in a more narrow sense.  The focus of the task is narrow, as are the analysed aspects of the
technology.  The aim is to produce a set of criteria that may be used in a decision support tool.
However, it is important to note that the tool is not an IA comparable to SIA, Surveillance IA, PIA,
or TA, but it does utilise many of their key elements and concepts.  Furthermore, this set of criteria
is not expected to replace these other forms of IA; on the contrary, it is more of a precursor to such
assessments.  In that sense, this research develops somewhat of a pre-IA-assessment which could be
performed on a group of selected technologies to determine which best fits the implementer’s
needs.  The aim is to improve decision-making in order to identify the potential impacts of
technology and direct attention to the issues an implementer may face. Once these issues have been
highlighted, it is expected that further investigation would take place where necessary.  However, in
this research only the criteria set will be assessed, the other functions of the tool are outside of the
scope of the thesis.  Thus only which criteria are to be included and excluded, why and how they
were chosen is the process that is described in this thesis.
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3. Research Methods
The research for the thesis is divided into two main parts, both of which are integral to the chosen
research method, Q Methodology (Q).  Firstly, there was a process of identifying and developing
criteria through literature research; and secondly, testing the usefulness of the criteria to
stakeholders using an online version of Q research software.  The first part relates to the aspect of
identifying and defining the concourse (or statements of communication) in preparation for a Q
study, and the second is the empirical process of performing an assessment of the concourse, which
produces the research results.  The following sections describe in greater detail the methodology of
the study, beginning with an introduction to Q and followed by an explanation of how Q was
utilised in this study.
Q Methodology was first developed by a British physicist-psychologist William Stephenson in
1935 (Brown, Steven, Danielson & van Exel 2015, p. 524).  The purpose of Q is to enable a
researcher to “discern people's perceptions of their world from the vantage point of self-reference”
(McKeown & Thomas 2013, p. 1).  Q allows a researcher to investigate subjectivity, and does so in
an efficient way compared to other methods, as Q research is often able to produce results using
small numbers of respondents, and allows the use of online resources.  Q also facilitates the
convergence of qualitative and quantitative research, by assigning the inherently qualitative
(subjectivity) a quantitative value.  Thus, Q enables the assessment of the criteria sets from the
perspective of individual stakeholders.
3.1 Q Sample
In Q, the researcher identifies the area of operation and looks into the background of the subject,
known as the ‘concourse’.  This might include academic literature, newspaper articles, televised
news interviews, opinion pieces, anything that basically constitutes “the flow of communicability
surrounding any topic” which might manifest in “ordinary conversation, commentary and discourse
of everyday life” (van Exel & de Graaf 2005, p. 4).  The gathered material should represent the
opinions and arguments that exist on a topic, and could be the representative views of politicians,
companies, organisations, lay people, professionals, or scientists to name just a few (van Exel & de
Graaf 2005, p. 4).  The concourse should contain the relevant discourses that exist on a topic.  These
discourses, once identified, are turned into statements and are referred to collectively as the Q
Sample.
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3.1.1 Identifying the data (Concourse)
For this research, the main sources of data consisted of documents produced by EU-level projects
such as ValueSec (2013) and DESSI (2013) among others, as well as other academic,
organisational, and EU-level policy documentation.  The qualitative criteria sets from the ValueSec
and DESSI projects formed the main structure of the data, with the latter documents providing
support and justification for the inclusion of the criteria into the final data set.  The following
paragraphs introduce the importance of the ValueSec and DESSI data for this research.
Qualitative, or “soft” criteria can be defined as “criteria of relevance for a decision which cannot be
quantified by a certain physical or logical dimension in the way costs or quantities of damages can
be quantified” (Pérez & Machnicki 2013a, p. 91).  Simply put, qualitative criteria discuss factors of
how individuals think, feel or believe.  The list of criteria in the ValueSec and DESSI projects
numbered close to 100 for the former, and just over forty for the latter.  One major concern for
stakeholders involved in the ValueSec project was that while the concept of a criteria assessment
was extremely promising, the large number of criteria meant the process had the potential to
become very complex and time-consuming (Blobner 2013b, p. 43).  Thus, one of the main tasks of
this research is to produce a criteria set of a ‘workable’ number: approximately 35-50.
The overall goal of ValueSec was “to develop a tool-set to support policy decision makers in
balancing decisions with overall policy objectives, political and ethical values, and societal
concerns” in relation to security decisions. This current thesis proposes to create a set of criteria that
will also aim to contribute to the development of such a toolset; however, this toolset is focused
more towards technology decisions.  This refocusing of the criteria set is not seen to be overly
problematic, as Blobner (2013a, p. 22) notes that the criteria list is ‘fully customizable, so that new
categories/criteria can be added and currently present can be deleted’.  This last point is especially
important as it confirms that it is necessary to adjust the criteria sets in order to ensure a relevant
assessment process.
The original list of ValueSec criteria also contains so-called “killer criteria” which are assigned a
minimum threshold.  Designating a particular criteria as “killer” means that it is essential to satisfy
this threshold (for example: legal requirements being fulfilled) in order to move past the planning
stage.  A failure to meet the threshold in the given example would lead to a suspension of the
assessment, as the legal requirements would prevent the implementation of the policy.  Once these
killer criteria are assessed to be above the threshold, other “soft criteria” can be assessed.
The ValueSec (Kaufmann 2012, p. 30) list of soft criteria included the following:
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· society (groups, including the meso-level),
· individuals (personal level),
· law and regulations,
· rights and ethics (which are structurally different from law and regulations),
· politics, economics (indirect effects),
· technology and science,
· the environment, understood as built environment, living environment and natural
environment in the classic sense.
The current research considers whether all of these categories are necessary, and attempts to
implement some key findings of the ValueSec Project in regards to the QCA.  Specifically, the
importance of making the criteria selection process transparent by supporting them with academic
literature; ensuring that overlapping criteria are reduced or accounted for in other ways;
implementing a common scale of measurement for all criteria; and allowing certain criteria (e.g.
legal) to be weighted more heavily (Blobner 2013a, pp. 22-7).  These, along with reducing the total
number of criteria, and applying them to technology implementation, are the challenges this
research will attempt to address.
Additional sources of information also provided support for the inclusion of statements into the
concourse, such as EU-level projects in the field of IA, whether it be focused specifically on
surveillance, society, privacy or technology in particular.  Documents such as the EU Charter of
fundamental rights (Official Journal of the European Union 2012), European impact assessment
guidelines (European Commission 2009b), publications by the Fundamental Rights Agency and the
EU border control agency Frontex, as well as academic literature on ethics and IA are also utilised.
The concourse included areas surrounding social impacts, fundamental rights, legal frameworks,
economic impacts (CBA) and risk assessments, however even though these aspects form part of the
discourses in the field, they are considered in the CBA and RRA sections of the tool to which this
research will contribute.  Therefore, although these latter two issues were apparent in the wider
concourse, they were not included in depth in the Q Sample.  This was a decision made to ensure
the final Q Sample was within the aims of the project (concise, yet covering the relevant areas).
Thus, the Q sample was drawn from relevant academic literature as well as the existing criteria sets
of the ValueSec and DESSI projects.  The role of the academic literature was to support the
inclusion of the DESSI and ValueSec criteria in the new criteria set through multiple reference
points, and to contribute to areas relevant to ABC technology that were not covered by the existing
24
criteria sets.  This was seen as important as there was little public information available about the
criteria selection process for those projects.
3.1.2 Q Sample construction
A Q sample generally consists of 40 to 50 statements drawn from the discourses found in the
concourse, and is more ‘art than science’ according to Brown (in Van Exel 2005, p.6).  Paige and
Morin (2014, p. 6) describe this as the ‘inductive’ or ‘unstructured’ method to creating a Q sample,
where the researcher must select the relevant statements when no pre-existing theory exists.  Thus,
themes that emerge from a review of the concourse become the basis for the selection of statements.
The alternative to this would be the ‘deductive’ or ‘structured’ approach, whereby statements are
chosen based on theoretical considerations.  In the deductive approach, a matrix is used to define
relevant criteria, usually dictating the number of statements allowed in each section.  For this
research, such an approach was seen to be more limiting, as it was difficult to precisely define the
necessary factors, and it was felt that this may restrict the inclusion of some statements.  A note on
terminology is useful here.  While the main components of QCA are criteria, the process of Q
utilises statements.  For the purposes of this research, the two are essentially the same.  The Q
statements simply represent the concept of the QCA criteria as identified in the literature (see
Appendix B).
In essence, the inductive method means that the researcher is generally able to decide themselves
which statements should be included or excluded.  Thus, it is likely that two different researchers
looking at the same concourse could select different statement to assess in their Q sample. This is
not necessarily seen to be an issue as the aim of constructing a Q sample is to produce something
which is representative of the diverse range of views that exist on the topic (van Exel & de Graaf
2005, p. 5).  Additionally, it is the participants who give meaning to the statements through their
sorting and ranking process, creating the relationships between statements and giving a view of
their perspective (van Exel & de Graaf 2005, p. 5).  Van Exel (2005) argues that even when
different researchers draw different statements from the concourse, it has been demonstrated that
the overall results identified in the resulting studies still converge on the same perspectives: that is,
the same perspectives are usually still recognised in each.
Q samples are usually created through a process involving interviews and literature research
(McKeown & Thomas 2013, p. 18), however, in this research much of the data for the Q sample
was already presented in the form of the ValueSec and DESSI deliverables.  The purpose of
interviews in arranging a Q sample is normally to define the important issues that exist around the
topic.  However, in the current study there was no need to interview stakeholders to ask what the
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important aspects of technology assessment were: this task had, in effect, already been completed
through the research and stakeholder workshops organised in the DESSI (see European
Commission 2014a) and ValueSec (see Blobner 2013a, 2013b) projects.  Both criteria sets had been
developed using stakeholder participation and feedback.  Therefore attention could be placed on the
criteria sets, as well as other important reports, deliverables, articles and conference papers relevant
to the issue at hand.  In this sense the process was towards more of an ‘adapted’ Q sample which
may contain items of a more factual nature (McKeown & Thomas 2013, p. 20).
Once I had identified the relevant literature, I focused my attention on the different qualitative or
‘soft’ criteria that were presented in the ValueSec and DESSI projects.  First of all I compared these
two and noted that the DESSI (Čas & Kaufmann 2012) criteria were much more concise, with 42
compared with 124 criteria for ValueSec (Kaufmann 2012).  It is important to note that these are
only the criteria available in public deliverables, in one of the latter ValueSec project documents it
is noted that the criteria total 98, and that there had been an active effort to reduce the number of
criteria (Pérez & Machnicki 2013b).  Unfortunately, I was not able to access the restricted
deliverables and thus I had to rely on the publicly available information.  With the two sets of
criteria, I began to look at how these were justified or supported in the deliverables.  The ValueSec
deliverable offered little in the way of methodological framework when it came to why or how
these specific criteria were chosen.  The DESSI deliverable did however offer some justification, as
most of the criteria were presented in categories that were briefly described and supported using a
number of references.  However, individual criteria themselves were not supported, nor was there
any explanation of methodology presented in the public deliverables for how the criteria were
selected.
As mentioned earlier, a Q sample should consist of a manageable number of statements.  McKeown
and Thomas (2013, p. 23) note that a Q sample does not need to include all possibilities, but rather
they should be a ‘comprehensive but manageable representation of the concourse’.  For this reason
it was decided to limit the Q sample to a range of 35-45 statements, which is within the range
suggested by Ward (2010, pp. 77-8).  Thus the concourse consisted of at least the 42 DESSI and
124 ValueSec criteria (many of which overlapped), plus other discourses from relevant literature.
Ockwell (2008, p. 271) noted that from 304 identified concourse statements in his research, only 36
were eventually selected for inclusion in the Q sample demonstrating that my task was indeed
achievable.
Initially I began by creating an excel sheet which listed the DESSI and ValueSec statements side-
by-side.  I then went through these criteria and marked the criteria that were applicable to the
26
current research green, which were potentially applicable orange, and those that were not applicable
were highlighted in grey.  For example, the DESSI criteria ‘Private life’ and the ValueSec criteria
‘Privacy, personal data and liberty’ were marked green as these issues are relevant to technology
assessments involving border control technology.  However, criteria addressing cost-benefit
analysis and risk reduction were marked grey as these issues are not relevant to this current
research.  The ValueSec criteria ‘Aesthetics (sensual: sight, smell, sound)’ was also marked grey as
it is generally understood that there are impacts on sight, smell and sound of any technology
implementation, but not on the large scale that something like a dam, or security fence might
impose.
Once the criteria had been assigned a colour, I began reading through the literature, looking at
whether such criteria had been mentioned as important, or included in other impact assessments of
security technology.  In some cases, I also identified issues that were not covered adequately by
neither the DESSI nor ValueSec criteria. Usually these were related more specifically to border
control technologies and were identified through documents such as Frontex Operational
Guidelines, or supported by statements in recent conference papers or reports on Smart Borders.  As
an example, issues of technology availability and reliability with ABC systems were added, as these
are essential to consider according to the Technical Study on Smart Borders (European Commission
2014c), and the Smart Borders Final report (EU-LISA 2015, p. 13), and the Frontex Best Practice
Operational Guidelines (Frontex 2012a, p. 28).
Other literature was also sought to provide a wider range of input into the document.  For example,
searching the EBSCO Academic search complete journal databases for “impact assessment of
technology” returned Hempel et al.’s (2013) article entitled “Towards a social impact assessment of
security technologies: A bottom-up approach”.  This article was written as part of the SIAM (2011)
project, and through this article and contact with Dr Hempel I was able to locate more material
relating to EU projects in the field of impact assessment.  Some of these projects included CRISP
(2014), PACT (Atos 2013), PRISE (2009), and SAPIENT (Wright et al. 2014).  By utilising these
resources I was able to tailor my approach to the concourse to include relevant information from not
only DESSI and ValueSec, but also from these projects.  In a similar way I was also able to follow
the trail of citations and references to discover other relevant literature.
From this literature I attempted to support each criteria statement with at least one reference.  As an
example,
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Table 1 shows six of the criteria which have been developed.  Many of these criteria also could be
supported using the ValueSec and DESSI criteria, however, I chose to not to add those references to
ensure the statements were not self-referential.
Table 1: Examples of statements with supporting references
ID Criteria Name Statement Reference
2 Definition ofpurpose
It is important that the technology's purpose and
scope of use  be clearly defined by implementers in
order to clarify what the technology will be used for,
what kind of information will be gathered from
whom, and who will own and have access to this
information.
(Atos 2013, p. 63;
European Commission
2014b, p. 81; Kindt
2013, p. 345; Wright et
al. 2014, pp. 38-9;
Wright & Raab 2012,
pp. 619, 22).
10 Employment
It is wise to consider whether the technology
implementation has an impact on the number and
quality of available jobs.
(European Commission
2009a, p. 7, 2009b, p.
35)
14 Politics/
democracy
It is wise to identify whether the technology
implementation and policy supports or undermines
democratic participation or national political culture
(Sollie 2009a, p. 201;
Wright et al. 2014, p. 38;
Wright & Raab 2012, p.
619)
16 Procurement
The tendering process should be clearly defined and
state the roles and expectations of the implementer
and the technology providers, including ownership,
maintenance and supply of hardware, software, data
and services.
(Frontex 2012a, pp. 14,
29-30; Lodge 2013, p.
312)
23 Availability/
reliability
It is essential to ensure the technology meets an
extremely high level of operational availability, and
fall-back options are developed to deal with any
unexpected unavailability.
(EU-LISA 2015, p. 13;
European Commission
2014c, p. 250; Frontex
2012a, pp. 24, 40-1;
Kindt 2013, p. 356)
37 Privacy bydesign
A vital aspect of assessing the technology is whether
it has been developed using the 'privacy-by-design'
principle:  the privacy of the individual is considered
essential, and is integrated into the system design
process from concept planning through to the final
product.
(European Commission
2012a, p. 12, 2014b, p.
32; Kindt 2013, pp. 363-
6)
Table 1 shows a selection of statements including their identification numbers, critera names, and
references.  Criteria names were given based on the key aspect which the literature addresses.  As a
further description, statement number 2 (S2) ‘Definition of Purpose’ was supported through the
following excerpt from literature “it’s important to justify why and how the dataveillance
techniques are appropriate for the collection and processing of personal data” (Atos 2013, p. 63).
Additionally “The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified…and the
subsequent use limited to the fulﬁlment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible
with those purposes and as are speciﬁed on each occasion of change of purpose” (European
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Commission 2014b).  While these statements refer more to data protection issues, others pertain
more directly to the policy itself: “Who is being surveiled by whom and for what purpose?” and
additionally “Who will have access to the data gathered by a surveillance system and how will such
data be used?” (Wright et al. 2014, p. 38).  Including aspects of data protection in a criteria labelled
as ‘Definition of purpose’ and not under ‘Data Protection’ was a decision made to try to ‘package’
related issues into one criteria. Of course, these could be separated, but questions of why an
individual’s data is being surveilled or assessed demands an answer of purpose related to the policy.
Thus this statement responds to the questions “what will it do and how will it do it?” as opposed to
the question which would be asked of the Data Protection criteria: “Does it meet specific data
protection requirements?” which is a legal requirement of the system.  Moreover the Definition of
purpose criteria is one which is referred to multiple times.  For example, in order to assess if a
particular technology is the best choice in terms of addressing the problem at hand, one must refer
back to the purpose to see if it fulfills all of the required aspects.
As can be seen, many of these criteria have some minor overlaps.  One of the aims of this research
was to minimise the amount of overlaps in the criteria, however, this has proven far more complex
than anticipated.  As such, it is expected that the reduction of overlapping features will be an
ongoing part of the project.
The process noted above for the selection of supporting literature for each statement can be
extrapolated for the remainder of those listed in
Table 1, and for the remaining statements as well.  It should be noted that a small number of
statements have very “thin” supporting references, for example, the statement regarding impacts on
employment has only two supporting references outside of the ValueSec and DESSI criteria.  These
two references are more related to recommendations for EU policy-level assessments, and thus their
inclusion is only weakly supported.  Nevertheless, the criteria is included in order to gauge
stakeholder perception of this issue.
3.1.3 Pretesting workshop: Piloting the Q Sample
On the 8th February 2016, I held a workshop session at VTT Tampere to perform initial testing of
the statements and the Q sorting procedure.  Five colleagues with varying backgrounds in risk
management, engineering and anthropology attended the workshop.  The information given to the
participants was that there were a number of aims of this workshop: firstly, to perform an initial
assessment of a technology using the statements developed so far in order to assess the functionality
of the statements.  Second, to assess how participants responded to a ‘forced’ distribution ranking
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procedure.  Third, to develop categories into which the criteria can be organised. Finally, to identify
any potential “killer criteria”.  The assessment of statements during this stage is an important part of
what Watts and Stenner (2005, pp. 75, 87) call ‘piloting’. Piloting is usually done by a small
number of participants, including some individuals with subject-specific experience, whose role is
to assess the statements to ensure clarity, identify duplicity and redundancies, and to assess the
balance of the statements (Watts & Stenner 2005, p. 87).  As such, this process is an important part
of the method of performing Q, and thus is included here in the method section, not in the results.
The workshop began with an introduction of the aims of the research and about the tasks which
were about to be performed.  Large paper (A1 size) sorting templates and 46 statements printed on
paper and cut into 5cm by 10cm cards were given to three participants, while two other participants
performed the Q sort using the computer-based application.
The participants were given stakeholder roles in order to help identify other viewpoints that may
cause the statements to be interpreted differently.  The roles were border authority, ethics
researcher, security researcher, technology manufacturer, and public/civil society organisation.  The
first task given was to perform the Q sort using the method of instruction provided by the HTMLQ
application (described below in 3.3).  This initial Q sort template consisted of seven columns ranked
as simply “-“ on the far left, to “+” on the far right (see the screenshot of the sorting table in Image
3 below), as suggested in personal correspondence with Steven Brown (2016).
Image 3: Pre-test sorting table from HTMLQ application.  A paper version was hand-drawn on A2 graph paper.
The next task given to the participants was to organise their 46 statements into groupings or
categories that they felt were natural.  The participants were simply asked to create four to six
groups that included criteria that were related in some way.  They were also asked to give their
categories a title and to try to identify any criteria that they think might be “killer criteria”
(Kaufmann 2012, p. 56), that is, criteria which should have a minimum threshold (such as legal or
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security provisions being met), and to highlight any statements which seemed to overlap, or were
not clear enough
3.1.4 Pilot Results and feedback
Initially, one participant who was using the computer-based application was unable to get it to
function correctly, and so they switched with another participant who was doing the paper sorting.
The issue seemed to be due to internet browser incompatibilities (the application would only work
on the Firefox browser, not Chrome or Internet Explorer) when running the application straight
from a .zip file, however this issue had no effect on the online version of the application.
In hindsight, assigning stakeholder roles may have complicated the goals of the workshop, as
individuals found it difficult to think about these abstract statements from a viewpoint that may not
have been natural to them.  Nonetheless, it also produced some interesting results that demonstrated
that each participant understood the statements in a slightly different way, with some really going
into depths about how their stakeholder role might understand a certain statement.
Interestingly the first person to complete the sorting task was a participant using the application,
taking around 26 minutes to perform the initial sorting, final sorting and ranking, and then
answering the background questions on the final page (the full process of sorting is described below
in chapter 3.3).  The second participant using the application took almost twice as long to completed
the process, however this individual also left the room numerous times to answer phone calls.  The
three other participants who completed the paper versions had much more difficulty following the
condition of instruction, even though the instruction was given verbally and displayed on a large
screen in the room.  This can be contributed to the fact that each individual was completing the sort
at a slightly different pace, and so giving the instructions once to all three of them was not as
effective as if I was able to give them individual instruction before they began each step.  On
reflection, it should be noted that these Q sorting tasks are usually performed one-on-one, not in
groups.  This process took the paper sorters between 35 and 45 minutes.  Once participants had
completed their sorting, the entire paper was photographed.
In regards to the first and second aims of the workshop performing an initial assessment and
feedback about ‘forced’ distribution, all except one participant had difficulty performing the
ranking stage of the Q sort.  This is the stage where the statements are ordered according to those
that the sorter finds most unimportant to most important.  The main feedback was that the
participants would like to rank more of the statements on the positive side, as they felt many of the
statements were almost “norms”.  Participants also noted that by using the labels “+” and “-“, they
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also felt as if anything they placed under the “-“ must be something which they viewed negatively.
This type of feedback was not unexpected, as the sort contains mostly rather objective statements,
and it is difficult to decide whether human rights issues are more important than security issues for
example.  In order to clarify further the purpose of the sorting procedure, the condition of
instruction for the final questionnaire was modified to include a paragraph that reiterated what the
sorting process was meant to achieve:
Placing a statement in the “-” column (or any of the other pink columns) does not necessarily
mean you disagree with, or find that statement unimportant (or even negative) by itself.  What it
indicates is that when you compare it with the other statements, you find this particular
statement less important than those you place to its right.
An alternative to forced distribution (as exampled in Image 3 above), would be to allow “free”
distribution.  This is just what it sounds like: participants are allowed to place the statements
wherever they wish.  However, a number of academics have noted that there is almost no difference
between forced and free ranking in Q except that forced distribution reduces unnecessary work on
the part of the researcher and is more convenient for participants (see Brown, S 1985; Cottle &
McKeown 1980; Watts & Stenner 2005, p. 77).  Due to this fact, forced distribution is retained for
the final study.  As a further note, the HTMLQ application (see below) requires each column to
contain a heading in order to display a participant’s results accurately in the submission report.  In
Image 3 above there are only headings in the far left and far right columns (“-” and “+”
respectively).  Because of this the participant’s scores are returned as, for example: |-| |+|0|-|+| | |- ,
whereby Statement 1 was placed under the “-“, Statement 2 two was placed under one of the four
unnamed columns, Statement 3 under the “+” column and Statement 4 under the 0.  Thus, it was not
possible to determine which statements were placed under the columns without a heading.  In this
regard I was not able to follow Brown’s (2016) advice to use only “+” and “-” symbols in the
extreme columns. Thus I reverted to more “traditional” numbered column headings with a “-4” to
“+4” distribution, also creating a ‘flatter’ distribution by moving from five to seven columns.  This
is in line with recommendations from van Exel and de Graaf (van Exel & de Graaf 2005, pp. 6-7),
and also from McKeown and Thomas (2013, p. 29), who note that when participants are expected to
have strong opinions about the topic, or when strong beliefs or emotions are involved, a flatter
distribution is preferable.  For this study it is expected that participants will have strong opinions,
but on the other hand, there still needs to be room in the middle of the distribution for ambiguity or
indecisiveness (Van Exel & de Graaf 2005, pp. 6) and thus a -4 to +4 distribution is preferred over a
-3 to +3 or a -5 to+5.
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The feedback regarding the initial sorting of statements gave a good indication that there were a
number of statements which were either unclear, unnecessary, or redundant.  Following the
workshop, I reviewed the comments from the participants and modified a number of statements to
correct the issues.  A total of seven statements were either removed, or modified and incorporated
with similar statements, and one statement was added, bringing the new total to 40.
One participant suggested the wording of the statements should be changed to ensure ‘should’ is not
used, as this created the feeling that the participant had to either agree or disagree with the statement
(instead of agreeing more or agreeing less).  For example, “Technology should be assessed to
identify compliance with laws” could be rephrased as “It is wise to assess new technology to ensure
compliance with laws”.  This was seen to be a statement that is more easily ranked, and is in line
with feedback received from Steven Brown (2016).
The category creation exercise produced interesting results with each participant producing a
slightly different set of categories and thus criteria groupings.  The participants divided the
statements into three, four, five, six and eight categories.  These were quite diverse categories, and
although there were similar headings such as ‘policy’ and ‘privacy’, the statements in each category
varied from participant to participant.  The groupings demonstrate that each individual will assign
relationships between the different statements according to their understanding of the statements.
Finally, the task of identifying killer criteria also produced mixed results.  Some participants did not
fully complete the task and thus the results are of little use for developing the killer criteria at this
stage.  This issue will however be discussed later in the results section.
3.1.5 Finalising the Q sample
Once the initial process of identifying the data, developing an initial version of the Q sample and
performing a pilot had been completed, the Q sample could be finalised and organised.
The sample was organised according to a rough range of categories that followed a modified
PESTLE (Politics, Economics, Society, Technology, Legal, Environment) or STEEPLE (a different
order and the addition of Ethics) approach8.  However, this research does not specifically take into
account economic factors other than those included in the Society dimension, and only one
environmental factor is included.  Thus, the statements can be sorted into the following four
categories: Policy, Ethics, Society, Technology and Legal (PESTL).  The PESTLE (or in this case
PESTL) approach is usually utilised in strategic analysis, or risk management (Tovstiga 2013) and
8 For more information see http://pestleanalysis.com/steep-and-steeple-analysis/
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is basically a framework for organising identified factors into their relevant groups for assessment.
In this thesis, I only use the PESTLE approach for the organising of statements into their respective
categories.
The organising of the criteria into groupings is somewhat of a subjective process.  Following on
from the subjectivity involved in selecting statements to include, the process of grouping is also
impacted by the researcher’s interpretations of where the statement best fits.  This is most apparent
in the Social and Ethical categories.  For example, should assessing whether a technology has a
negative social, cultural or economic impact on third countries be considered a social or ethical
issue?  It is not an issue which affects the society of the implementer, but rather, most likely that of
a non-EU country.  These are considered ‘social’ impacts by the European Commission’s Impact
Assessment Guidelines (2009b, pp. 33-7), however, they also deal with the morality of decision-
making and its effects on others, and thus could also be considered under the Ethical category.
Wright and Raab (2012, p. 617) note how the categories of impacts and issues are not mutually
exclusive in their Surveillance IAs, that is, although they are placed under one heading, they could
very well be placed under another as well.
3.2 P Sample
The next step of the process is to select participants (P sample) to whom the Q Sample is
administered.  The participants rank-order the statements in a table and produce what is called a Q
sort.  Once the desired number of Q sorts have been completed, the researcher performs factor
analysis to identify the different correlations that exist between the results of the P sample.  When
participants rank statements in a similar fashion, they are noted as sharing a similar perspective or
viewpoint on the topic.  Thus the strength of Q is that it takes subjective questions (how or what  the
participant feels, thinks, agrees or finds important about the topic) and allows participants to
“indicate their reactions to a deﬁned subject area within their own terms” (Ockwell 2008, p. 270).
Human subjectivity is defined by McKeown and Thomas (2013, p. 2) as “the communication of a
personal point of view” which is “inherently expressive and tied to the human capacity for sharing
impressions through language and other sensory means”.  Q as a research method asks respondents
to produce an empirical representation of their personal viewpoint of the issue at hand (McKeown
& Thomas 2013, p. 3).  In this sense Q is the perfect fit for assessing the qualitative impacts of
technology-an essential aspect of this research-, as it allows the respondents to translate “their
feelings into rankings” (Brown, Steven, Danielson & van Exel 2015, p. 532).  Yet Q respondents
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are not simply asked to rank statements on a scale of one to ten as one would a Likert scale.  Instead
the respondent is asked to compare each statement with the others in a rank-ordering procedure (the
Q sort) which “forces participants, consciously or subconsciously, to reveal their personal choice,
feelings, and underlying beliefs” (Paige & Morin 2014, p. 2).  Q thus takes advantage of the human
desire to “structure stimuli, ascribe meaning, or offer a viewpoint” (Ward 2010, p. 75) on the topic
at hand.
When it comes to participant selection, Q again allows the researcher to select the sample according
to his or her needs.  As there is no attempt at producing results representative of society at large,
there is no need for a representative selection on the basis of age, sex, income, religion and so forth.
The researcher may select participants on theoretical (their relevance to the study) or pragmatic
(anyone will suffice) grounds (McKeown & Thomas 2013, p. 32).  In dit Dariel, Wharrad and
Windle’s (2010) study on views towards the use of technology in nurse education, theoretical
considerations governed the selection as experts in nursing and nurse education were approached to
participate. Van Exel and de Graaf’s (2005, pp. 15-6) example was less specific and approached
non-captive/choice travellers, in other words, as long as the respondents could answer the questions
about travel and commuting, they were able to participate.  In Ockwell’s study of perspectives on
Australian fire management policy, stakeholders from local Aboriginal groups, government
scientists, wildlife management, pastoralists, tourists, and share-hold landowners were approached.
Thus while the desired type of participant is usually quite specific, there may still be cases where
the view of non-experts is useful and provides an alternative perspective, as demonstrated in
Ockwell’s inclusion of tourists.  However, initial feedback from the pilot workshop indicated that
individuals without much background knowledge of at least some of the areas discussed in the
questionnaire may find it very difficult to respond.  In this sense, members of the public were not
consulted, but their representatives were asked to contribute.  In particular, traveller representative
and societal organisations were selected to represent the public in general.
3.2.1 Selection of participants
In order to maximise the benefit from the questionnaire, specific respondents were targeted to
contribute to the research. A stakeholder can be defined quite broadly as ‘individuals or groups who
are impacted by, or can impact, the work or its outcomes at this particular time in the lifecycle of
the work’(Bourne 2012).  However, Cuppen et al. (2010, p. 579) give a slightly more focused
definition: “a stakeholder is deﬁned as an actor involved in, affected by, knowledgeable of, or
having relevant expertise or experience on the issue at stake”.  Although both of these definitions
emphasise the ability of a stakeholder to be involved in and impact the process, the definition of
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Cuppen et al. notes the importance of knowledge, expertise or experience in relation to the topic at
hand.  As Russell, Vanclay and Aslin (2010, p. 114) point out, each stakeholder not only has
different informational needs, but they are able to offer specific insights into the different aspects of
a technology-a key requirement for this research  As this research deals with quite complex topics,
the majority of stakeholders were selected for these attributes of knowledge, expertise and
experience.
Stakeholders can be broken down into groups such as those who are “affected by the policy,…who
will have to implement it…[or] who have a stated interest in the policy” (European Commission
2015a).  Schot (2001, p. 41) also notes that there are ‘roughly’ three major types of stakeholders
who contribute to technology assessments: technology actors who invest in and maintain
technology development programs; societal actors who experience the impact of the technology,
such as users, citizens, and workers; and regulators who develop the rules and represent a general
interest.  In certain processes, such as constructive technology assessment, another actor is also
usually involved: the dialogue facilitator and modulator (ibid.).  Russel, Vanclay and Aslin (2010,
p. 110) mention three similar categories: technology developers, decision makers, and users.
Technology developers and those who invest in technology must be included in any stakeholder list,
as they often directly shape the impact of the technology through their decisions in the design,
manufacture and production of technology.  Likewise, decision-makers will often choose certain
aspects of a technology which are required and which are not.  As Schot and Rip (1997, p. 257)
have argued “impacts are not just passive effects of a given technology on its environment, but are
actively sought (or avoided) by technology producers, users, and third actors such as governments,
unions, and pressure groups alike.”  Thus, any actor that is involved in the decision-making process
of the technology implementation has an opportunity to affect that technology’s impact on society.
In this regard stakeholders were divided into three main groups: Decision Makers (or
implementers), Users/Society (or those affected and their representatives), and Industry (or those
who have a stated interest in the policy).  These categories were placed in a table and then actors
were added in each category according to their roles (see Table 2).  As noted by Schot (2001, p. 41),
these categories are useful for analytical purposes, and actors could often be placed in numerous
boxes.  For example, in Table 2 below Border Authorities could also be listed in the in the column
under ‘Invest and Maintain’ as they may also invest in technology development.  However, the
table is designed as a guide to ensure relevant stakeholder areas were covered, not as a catchall,
exhaustive list.  As another example, stakeholders representing the natural environment are not
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explicitly listed here. As the ABC technology itself will usually be placed within existing
infrastructure, and not in the natural environment (unlike a dam, a power plant, or a military base),
the expected immediate impact on the environment is lower, and as such no environmental groups
are listed as stakeholders.  However, environmental issues are still covered in the criteria set as
some implementations of ABCs may be outdoors in port areas (sea ports and land border crossings).
Table 2 Stakeholder Identification
EC 2015a Implement the Policy Affected by the Policy Stated Interest in Policy
Russell et al.
(2010)
Decision Makers Users/Society Technology Developers
Schott (2001)
Regulators & General
interest
Experience the impact of tech. Invest & maintain tech
Government Policy Level
Border Auth.
Border
Mgmt.
Border Guard
Citizens Travellers Civil Soc.
Research/Academia Rights/legislation Ethics Tech Innov.
Manufacturers
Tech.
Design
Tech. Develp.
Port Operator Investors Owner
Definitions in grey boxes, Main stakeholder groups for this research in blue, and more focused
groups/tasks in pink.
After the table of stakeholders was developed, a list was created which included actors from each of
the pink squares in Table 2.  From the ‘Implementers’ column, policy makers from national- and
EU-levels, as well as border management authorities were added to the list.  The ‘Affected’
stakeholders included representatives from border guard, police and customs authorities (the user
level), while civil society organisations researchers focused on rights, ethics and legislation.  The
‘Travellers’ themselves could be represented by either individual members of the public or traveller
organisations. The third column, those with a stated interest in the policy, included representatives
from technology researchers and developers, as well as port operators.
Due to privacy and data protection reasons, the list organisations, or names of individuals is not
published in this document.  However, the initial list of potential participants numbered close to 100
individuals.  Most of these were participants in either the FastPass (2013b) or BODEGA (2015)
projects, but there were also a number of others from outside of these two projects.  In order to gain
useful results from this questionnaire, it was preferred that respondents would number at least 20,
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but preferably 30.  As mentioned earlier, Q Methodology does not require a large number of
respondents, only enough to illuminate the potential factors, therefore only around five or six
participants for each expected factor is suggested.  In this sense after a certain point, there is little or
no correlation between the number of respondents and the quality of the data.  This is one of the
reasons why Q Methodology was chosen as a research method, as it was expected that it would be
difficult to get a large number of respondents as required by traditional surveys.  Secondly, if there
were more respondents from a particular actor type than another, it is not expected to be an issue, as
Cuppen et al. (2010, p. 581) argue, although stakeholders may be selected by their affiliation type,
this does not necessarily mean they will represent a diversity of perspectives.  That is, despite the
fact that stakeholders can be divided into stakeholder groups, the expected perspectives may not
necessarily follow these lines, what is important here is to have diversity in stakeholders, and to
assess their perspectives through empirical analysis.
In order to introduce the participants a short 150 word ‘cover letter’ was drawn up which introduced
the research.  This cover letter was included in the body of the email that was sent to stakeholders,
along with a ‘Research Information Sheet’ (RIS) as an attachment.  The RIS is a two-and-a-half
page document that contained a more detailed explanation of the research on the first page, and the
consent information on the second.  At the bottom of the consent page was the internet address for
the online questionnaire along with the user (login) code.  The consent form noted explicitly that by
navigating to the link, and entering the user code, the stakeholders were giving their informed
consent to participate in the research.
The stakeholders were contacted either by individual, or by group emails.  Recipients were given
the freedom to pass on the email to their colleagues to complete as well.  Over the course of the
questionnaire being live, a number of ‘reminder’ emails were sent to try to boost participation rates.
3.3 Assembling the questionnaire using the HTMLQ application
The Q sorting process can be performed in a number of ways.  Previously the most common way
was using statements printed on cards which the participant would sort on a large score sheet.
Participants might perform an initial, or ‘pre’-sort by dividing the cards into three piles depending
on the condition of instruction, for example: Most negative, Neutral, Most positive.  Following this,
the participant is instructed to sort the cards in their order of preference on the score sheet.  In many
cases, the researcher would be in the room; however, it has been noted that because Q requires little
in the way of instruction, the sorting process can be performed without the researcher being present.
Thus van Exel and de Graaf  have conducted Q sorts via mail, while Paige and Morin (2014)
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followed up their P sample’s experiences with phone interviews.  Thus, there is the possibility to
perform the sorts in person, or by correspondence with the participants.  The alternative method is
to perform the sort via an online application.  This implies that the researcher is not present, but it
does not mean there is less ability to follow up with participants.  The following sections describe
the application that was utilised for this research.
The Q sorting tool HTMLQ is a HTML5 version of FlashQ, a now outdated Q sorting tool that runs
on the Flash multimedia and software program.  HTMLQ was chosen as it has a number of benefits
over FlashQ, the major one being that FlashQ does not seem to have been updated since 2007
(Hackert & Braehler 2007), and due to the fact that it therefore contains an outdated version of
Flash which had a number of known security vulnerabilities (Adobe 2007).  HTMLQ is based on
the FlashQ code with only a few minor differences in functionality, namely the ability to function
on Apple operating systems that do not utilise Flash (Approxima 2015).  HTMLQ is available for
anybody to use free on an Open Source licence and is distributed by “aproxima (sic) Gesellschaft
für Markt- und Sozialforschung Weimar” (Society for Marketing and Social Research Weimar)
(2015).
Using the HTMLQ application required editing the default settings that are provided in the
download package.  A more detailed description of this process is given in Appendix C.  Once the
application was edited and the information and questions relevant to the current research were
inserted, it was tested by a number of work, and student colleagues.  The feedback received from
these individuals helped to improve the instructions and operation of the application.  The main
issues identified by these colleagues were generally to do with punctuation and clarity of the
instructions and statements, but there were also concerns about whether individuals without
background knowledge in the field would be able to give useful responses.  This was one reason
why only relevant stakeholders with a background in the field were invited to participate.
For privacy and data protection reasons, the questionnaire had a universal user code, which
participants utilised to log in and perform the sorting task.  This meant that there was no way to
connect a response with an individual person, unless they chose to leave their information in the
feedback section of the questionnaire.  Anonymity of responses was seen to be a priority, especially
as individuals from border control agencies and other formal institutions were being asked to
respond.  In this way, individuals could respond however they wished without fear of being
connected to the data.  Of course, this also presented a number of challenges such as not being able
to know which of the stakeholders had completed the questionnaire, and which had not.  This
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complicated the process of sending ‘reminder’ invitations, which asked those who had not already
completed the questionnaire to do so if they had time.  The alternative to this, however, was to
retain a list of emails and unique user codes that could be used to check off which individuals had
completed the questionnaire.  Due to the way HTMLQ is coded, implementing this latter process
would also mean that the questionnaire could not have a login page which effectively allows only
users with a code to perform the questionnaire.  Thus, the more anonymous process was chosen,
despite its drawbacks.
3.3.1 The online Q Sort process
To perform the assessment the participant was required to navigate to the questionnaire web page
that was accessible on VTT’s public servers until April 2016.  After navigating to the web address,
participants are greeted with a welcome message (see the screenshot in Image 4 below) informing
them they are at the right location.
Image 4: Welcome page
After clicking on the Continue button as prompted, the participant was asked to give their consent
to participate in the research by using a login code (see Image 5).  This page requested that the
participant read the Research Information Sheet (RIS) that contains a brief introduction to the
research, a description of what data would be gathered and stored, and the information on consent.
By entering a universal user-code provided in the consent information, the participant was
effectively consenting to participate in the research according to the information given in the RIS.
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Image 5 Login page
Before the first step of the sorting process, an information page is displayed which gives an
overview of the research and what is being asked of the participant.  Much of this information was
also provided in the RIS (see Image 6).
Image 6: Introduction page
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At the start of every task, an information window is displayed explaining how to perform the
necessary tasks for each step (see Image 7 below).  The first step consists of ‘pre-sorting’, that is,
viewing the forty statements, one at a time, and sorting them into three categories, or ‘piles’ labelled
‘Most Unimportant’, ‘Neutral’ and ‘Most Important’ by dragging and dropping them, or by using
the 1,2, or 3 buttons on the keyboard (see Image 7 below).  The card appears in the centre of the
screen (white card), and then the respondent places it in one of the three boxes using the method
described above.  The cards change colour according to which box they are assigned: pink for
‘Most Unimportant’, grey for ‘Neutral’, and green for ‘Most Important’.
Image 7: Step 1 of the sorting process- condition of instruction (left), and an example of how the task might look during the
process (right).
The bottom of the screen contains a ‘progress bar’ which tells what percentage of the entire process
is complete, and to the right of this is a ‘Help Me!’ button which can be pressed to see the
instructions once more.
Step 2 is the main sorting stage where the participants are asked to read through the statements
again, beginning with the ‘Most Important’ pile, and place the four statements which they found to
be most important in the ‘+4’ column, then to do the same for the ‘Most Unimportant’ pile, placing
the statements in the ‘-4’ column (see Image 8 below).  This process of moving back and forth from
the opposite ends of the sorting table is repeated for the ‘+3’ and ‘-3’ columns, and then again until
all the statements from the three piles have been placed into the table.  The purpose of completing
the polar opposites first is that participants are expected to be able to identify these statements with
greatest ease, as these are the ones they feel most strongly about, as they move towards the centre
they thus have fewer statements remaining in their piles and are able to compare these more easily.
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Image 8: Step 2-the Q Sorting process
Once the sorting is complete, the ‘Continue’ button appears and allows the participants to move
forward. After clicking on the ‘Continue’ button, the instructions for Step 3 (see Image 9 below) are
shown.  In this step, the participants are given the opportunity to double-check that they are happy
with the way they have sorted statements, and are able to rearrange statements if necessary.  Once
they are happy with their sort, they click continue.
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Image 9: Step 3- An opportunity to double-check the sort before moving on
Step 4 (see Image 10) asks the participants to explain why they selected the particular statements
they placed under the ‘1’ and ‘9’ columns.  Participants are asked to give open answers justifying
their selections.  Once complete, the participants again click on the ‘Continue’ button.
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Image 10: Step 4- Participants are asked to give further information as to why they chose to place particular statements
under the -4 and +4 columns.
Step 5 contains questions relating to the background of the participant and their experience with the
questionnaire.  Question 1 asks the participants to indicate whether they are male or female in order
to help to assess the final distribution of participants.  In Question 2 they are asked to rank on a one-
to-five (disagree-to-agree) scale five statements.  These are: In my view the questionnaire was
interesting; I felt I have the experience to rank the statements; It was difficult to decide in which
order I should rank the statements; I thought there were some important aspects which were not
covered; I thought some statements overlapped each other.  These statements are not expected to
contribute to the overall results, but rather give feedback to the researcher about how the
participants viewed the exercise.  Question 2.a allows participants to comment further on any of
these issues in the provided text box should they wish.  Question 3 asks about the capacity in which
they have answered the questionnaire: either as a professional, or a member of the public.  The
distinction is made in order to clarify to which stakeholder group the participant belongs, although
admittedly it does require self-reporting and self-assessment of one’s own “qualifications” in terms
of experience.  Members of the public are not asked to detail their profession, but Question 4 asks
‘Professionals with experience in the field’ to identify what ‘field’ they work in (their profession)
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using a drop-down list. Question 5 asks how they would describe their employer using the same
method.  If the individual feels their profession and/employer are not covered by these categories,
they can select ‘Other’ and give more information in a text box in Question 6.  In this final question,
participants are also asked to give more information such as the country in which they operate,
clarifying comments on their profession (for example, someone who chose ‘Researcher’ may clarify
their research focus), the name of their organisation, and any other comments they wish to leave.
Only Questions 1, 2, and 3 are marked with an asterisk denoting that they are mandatory for all
participants, while ‘Professionals’ are strongly encouraged in the instructions to give responses to 4
and 5.  Question 6 is noted as being optional, as some professionals may not wish to disclose their
country of operation or organisation’s name.  In reality, the HTMLQ application contains a number
of bugs in regards to Step five, and thus the only questions that must be filled before the participant
can move on to the Submit Data page are Questions 1 and 3.
After completing the mandatory sections in Step 5, the participant again clicks continue and is
directed to the ‘Submit Data’ page where they click on the ‘Submit’ button to send their completed
questionnaire to the researcher.  Should the submission fail from some reason, a failure message is
displayed with other options for submission: by email, or by printing.
3.3.2 Discussion of Q Methodology
Once the participants have been selected and the Q sort completed, the results of the sort are
analysed.  The analysis correlates the participants by the way they think, and through factor analysis
they are then grouped together with others who share similar ways of thinking (Paige & Morin
2014, p. 3).  In this way, Q produces a result that demonstrates the correlation and number of
viewpoints on the topic of hand, not the number of people who share these viewpoints.  This is one
major reason why it is not necessary to interview a large number of respondents in Q, as Brown
notes:
If you wish to examine the diﬀerences in color between a tub full of green and a tub full of red
paint, for instance, a thimble of each will do and buckets full from the same tubs will only
provide redundant information. Similarly, in Q: If you are interested in examining the
diﬀerences between the thinking of factor A vs. factor B, three or four of each will do and
buckets full will not advance understanding markedly (Brown 1996, in Ward 2010, pp. 76-7).
Thus with a small sample size it is possible to analyse and bring coherence to issues which are
socially contested and complex in nature through the process of asking exploratory questions (Ward
2010, p. 76).  Therefore, Q is seen as the most functional method of investigation for the purposes
of the current research.  It allows the quantitative analysis followed by qualitative interpretation, of
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qualitative questioning, and provides a ‘hard’ measurement for the ‘soft’ and difficult-to-measure
criteria from the ValueSec and DESSI projects.
Q is not without its limitations however.  For example, with such small sample sizes there is no
possibility to assess the number of individuals in general who may hold the perceptions identified
through the study.  In other words, the results are not statistically representative of society in the
sense that X number of people hold perspective A.  Indeed, Q makes no attempt to perform such
tasks, as these are solely quantitative.  What Q does is identifies that X number of perspectives exist
within the population of the sample, and thus can generalise that these views also exist in society.
As Ockwell (2008, p. 273) notes: “the patterns revealed by a Q study can be considered to reﬂect
the discourses that exist in wider society”. Furthermore, McKeown and Thomas (2013, p. 32) note
that Q does not claim to be exhaustive in its identification of attitudes on the selected topic, after all,
the participant sample is highly selective-thus if the researcher feels as if a perspective may be
missed, he or she simply needs to widen the participant sample.  The P sample for this initial
research was adequately broad, however the time given to the participants to respond was
lengthened from three to four weeks in order to allow more time for more respondents to perform
the sorts.  This is a downside of utilising an open-invitation style of contacting participants where
they can participate should they choose, rather than contacting beforehand and confirming the
participant’s desire to contribute.  The approach used in this research, as noted earlier, involved
invitation emails to selected participants at first.  However, very few of these individuals responded
confirming their intention to participate, so further reminder emails were sent to individuals, then to
organisations, then project-wide reminders.  A mixed approach was thus utilised here, but still very
few participants responded to the emails and confirmed participation, thus the ever-widening P
sample.  All of these individuals still fell within the stakeholder map as described earlier; however,
a number still responded that they had limited prior knowledge of the issues discussed in the
research.
This now leads us from the discussion of methodology into the results of the Q sorts.  The following
section discusses the final results of the participants’ sorts, focusing on the number and type of
participants, as well as the factors that were discovered from the analysis of the Q sorts.
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4. Results and Discussion
4.1 Participants
In total 25 Q sorts were received back from the about 100 individuals who were invited to
participate in the research.  As the end of March approached only 15 sorts had been performed, and
thus the research period was extended by around ten days to allow more sorts to be gathered.  Due
to the inbuilt features of the questionnaire that prioritised privacy (discussed above), it was difficult
to determine exactly which individuals had completed the sorts.  However, over the research period
a number of individuals contacted me to note they had performed the sorting process, and I was also
able to ask if they would allow me to ask a number of further questions about their sort, and
experience.  In total four participants gave permission to do so.
It should also be noted that one border authority who was invited to participate declined to do so
citing lack of proper research authorisation on my behalf.  As the research permission application
process was too time-consuming to pursue during the allotted research timeframe, the invitations to
the members of that organisation were withdrawn by the organisation itself, and to the best of my
knowledge, no Q sort results from that organisation were received.  No other invitees expressed
concern over lack of research permission; however, it may also be the case that they may have done
so by simply not responding to the questionnaire, as approximately 75% of invitees did not respond.
Another individual promised to complete the questionnaire if I would in turn pay membership to
join a particular organisation that s/he represented; however, I thanked the individual for the offer,
but declined to do so.  Unfortunately, the HTMLQ application is not able to gather data on how
many individuals began the sorting process, but did not follow the process through to the data
submission page.
Due to the limitations of HTMLQ and privacy concerns noted above, there were a number of forms
in the final feedback section of the questionnaire that were optional.  Participants were encouraged
to complete optional sections about their profession, managerial responsibilities and employer, and
the majority did so, however, more than half did not note their country of operation.    The countries
of operation that were given are listed in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Countries of respondents
Belgium Italy Finland France Greece UK Romania Switzerland NG* Total
No. 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 13 25
*NG= Not Given
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Because many participants are known to each other through working relationships in different EU
projects, the country data that the participants self-reported is separated from the rest of the
participant information.  Additionally, the roles of participants in terms of management
responsibility were also separated.  The latter is reported in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Participants by managerial role
Role Number
No supervisory responsibility 8
Work leadership of one or more employees 9
Assistant manager over supervisors or a small department 1
Manager of one department 1
Manager of more than one department 1
Other9 2
Not Given 3
Total 25
4.2 Analysing the Q Sort results
Once all sorts had been received they were loaded into a data analysis computer programme for Q
studies called PQMethod, which was developed by Peter Schmolck (2015).  The programme is
capable of performing factor analysis using Centroid or PCA, and allows factors to be rotated
analytically using Varimax or by ‘hand’ by making use of two-dimensional plots.  In order to gain
the most accurate results it is often necessary to perform these tasks a number of times with
different combinations.  To determine the threshold for statistically significant results I utilised the
formula in Brown (1986, p. 64) noted as: Standard Error rate (SEr) = 1 / √n, where n = the number
of statements.  In this case the number of statements was 40 and thus SEr = 1 / √40 = 0.15.  For
loadings on any particular factor to reach a significance level of p < .01 they must reach (0.15*2.58)
(SEr) = ± .41.  Thus, a loading of ±.41 is statistically significant at the p < .01 level.
A number of different combinations of Centroid or Principle Components Analysis (PCA) with
Varimax or/and judgemental rotation were experimented with.  In Q, the aim of performing these
tasks is to try to get as many participants as possible to “land” on a factor, and thus a factor is
simply a grouping of participants with shared views.  In the end, similar factors were produced, but
for the results given here the combination of PCA and judgemental rotation, using three factors in
the PQMethod programme gave the strongest factor loadings.  This method produced a result where
9 Both participants reported as being consultants
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fourteen participants landed on Factor 1, four on Factor 2, four on Factor 3, one loaded on two
factors, and two did not load significantly on any factor.  The factor loadings, along with other data
of the participants are given in Table 5 below.  Note that there are loadings that are negatively
correlated with a factor.  In Q Methodology, this is referred to as a “bipolar factor” (Brown, S 1986,
p. 60; Watts & Stenner 2005, p. 88).  In such factors, a negative loading indicates a reversal of the
values that positively define a factor (McKeown & Thomas 2013, p. 12).  An example of this is P18
on Factor 2 (see Table 5), whereby a loading of -0.61 demonstrates a rather strong reversal of the
positive values of that factor.  This bipolarity and its implications on the interpretation of Factor 2 is
discussed further when examining the results shown in Table 8.
Following the table of factor loadings, an explanation of the defining characteristics of the three
factors is presented, showing the defining statements in each factor.  Although it has already been
said above, it is again worth noting that Q methodology does not analyse statements independently.
Thus when assessing the statements below in Table 7,Table 8 and Table 9 which have been
assigned to the lowest rank (-4), it must be remembered that these have been ranked according to
their relationship with other statements.  Therefore, although a negative statement of Factors 1 and
3 is statement 28 “The impact of the technology on the natural environment should be considered”,
this does not mean that the impact of the environment is unimportant.  What it means is that
individuals in Factors 1 and 3 generally assigned less importance to this statement than to other
statements that they considered to be more important.
The final row of Table 5 deserves a brief explanation here.  Although in Q total Explained Variance
(EV) is not always regarded as a relevant measurement, it is included here for reference sake.  As
noted by Cuppen et al. (2010, p. 584):
In regular R (not Q) factor analysis a total variance explained of 46% is considered low…  In Q
methodology however, variance explained is not considered a relevant measure, since one is not
interested in the question what the percentage of a perspective in the population is, but Q
methodology is developed to show that various factors exist, and what the similarities and
differences between these factors are.  If the variance explained of factor A is higher than that of
factor B, it only means that there are more people of factor A in the sample.
However, in this research the fact that these three factors together represent 44 percent of the EV
indicates that there is yet much to discover on this topic.  It means that there are issues that may not
be fully understood yet, and points towards a need for further research.
Finally, the correlations between factor scores matrix, demonstrating how each factor is related to
the others is presented in
Table 6.
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Table 5: Factor (F) Loadings and other Participant information
P# F1 F2 F3 Employer A Profession B Male/Female
P1 0.26 -0.40 0.50 CSO RA F
P2 0.04 0.62 0.22 GOV BA M
P3 0.63 -0.14 -0.15 UNI RA F
*P4 0.39 -0.22 0.64 CO - M
P5 0.54 0.24 0.17 EU GOV M
P6 0.63 -0.24 -0.24 Oth (C) M
P7 0.59 -0.33 0.29 CO TMD F
P8 0.19 0.58 -0.16 UNI RA F
P9 0.62 0.17 0.39 Oth (C) M
P10 0.41 -0.06 -0.23 GOV BA M
P11 0.73 -0.19 0.29 GOV BA M
P12 0.41 -0.31 0.06 CO SEC M
P13 0.65 -0.13 0.27 CO SEC M
P14 0.59 0.29 0.04 NP RA M
P15 0.15 0.10 -0.44 CO IT M
P16 -0.07 0.67 0.28 NP RA F
P17 0.57 0.00 -0.44 IC PO M
P18 0.37 -0.61 -0.02 CSO PO M
P19 0.57 0.13 0.38 NP RA F
P20 0.70 0.19 0.06 CO RA F
*P21 0.64 0.40 0.12 - - F
*P22 0.00 0.14 0.35 CO RA F
P23 0.58 -0.31 0.21 NP Oth F
P24 -0.11 0.30 0.43 CO PO F
P25 0.36 -0.00 -0.20 CO (RA+IT) F
%EV 24 11 9
Key: Bold values under Factor headings are significant (p< .01).
A simple hyphen “-” in a cell denotes where information was not given, an * denotes where the P self-reported as not
having significant background knowledge in the covered topics.
%EV: Explained Variance
A: Employer (CO= Company, CSO=Civil Society Org., EU=European Union, IC= Independent Consultant, GOV=
Government, NP= Non-Profit/Association or Organisation, UNI= University, Oth=Other).
B: Profession/Expertise (BA= Border Authority/Police, C= Consultant, IT= Information Technology, PO= Port
Authority, RA= Research/ Academia, SEC= Security, TMD= Technology Manufacturing/Development).  Results in
brackets e.g. (BA) indicate where the P responded ‘Other’ and clarified further their role.  The latter have been assigned
according to the researcher’s understanding.
Table 6: Correlations Between Factor Scores Matrix
F1 F2 F3
F1 1.00 -0.08 0.22
F2 -0.08 1.00 -0.03
F3 0.22 -0.3 1.00
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4.3 Interpretation of results
In this section, the results of the Q sorts will be interpreted to provide a narrative about the views of
each Factor group.  The discussion focuses mostly on the defining statements for each factor, that
is, those that have been ranked uniquely compared to other factors.  However, other statements
ranked towards the extreme poles are also included where it aids interpretation.  The entire table of
statements with their factor Q sort values is shown in Appendix A.  The interpretation also
discusses statements that were ranked similarly, otherwise known as Consensus Statements, before
looking at a number of issues identified with the statements.
4.3.1 Factor 1: Technologists
The defining statements from Factor 1 are shown below in Table 7.  Scores for the defining
statements are shown under the Factor 1 (F1) column below, with Factors 2 and 3 shown in italics
for comparison.  The PESTL categories are also shown under “Cat.” column, while an explanation
of the categories is given below the table.  The discussion of defining factors takes place below.
Table 7: Defining statements for Factor 1 in order of ranking, including PESTL Categories
Statement Cat.* F1 (F2) (F3)
1. It must be considered whether technology is the best option available, and
has been rigorously tested to ensure it addresses the problem adequately,  to the
requirements of the implementer, and be proven more effective or efficient than
existing, or alternative technologies.
T +4 -1 -4
2. It is important that the technology's purpose and scope of use be clearly
defined  by implementers in order to clarify what the technology will be used
for, what kind of information will be gathered from whom, and who will own
and have access to this information.
P +4 +2 -1
7. The technology should be secure in order to prevent tampering or
manipulation by unauthorised users and operators, including hacking,
tailgating, trespassing, spoofing etc.
T +4 -2 1
4. The technology should be attractive, ergonomic, intuitive and easy to use for
all user groups (operators, end users), preferably utilising universal user
interfaces, symbols and guidance.
T +3 -3 +4
29. It is important that the technology is flexible enough to adapt to legislation
changes, and to target use by the largest possible traveller cohort:
accommodating ID card holders, partnership arrangements with other countries,
minors, visa holders, residents, and multiple biometrics etc.
T +3 -3 0
17. It is crucial to assess new and innovative technologies to identify areas in
which they lack according to law, regulation, standards, or best practices.
L +2 -1 -3
31. It is wise for authorities to allow the public an opportunity to comment,
criticise or request clarification about the technology implementation/policy
P -2 +3 +2
3. It  is  important  to  take  the  issue  of  respect  for  freedoms  of  thought,
conscience, religion, expression and information into account when assessing
E -3 1 2
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the impact of technology.
10. It is wise to consider whether the technology implementation has an impact
on the number and quality of available jobs.
S -3 0 +3
11. It is wise to assess whether the technology has a negative social, cultural or
economic impact on individuals in third countries.
E -4 +1 +1
36. It would be wise to assess whether technologies might have a negative
impact on the social cohesion and solidarity of members of society.
S -4 +3 0
*PESTL Categories: Policy, Ethics, Society, Technology, Legal.
As shown above, Factor 1 weighed heavily on aspects of technology at the positive level.
Statements (S) 1 and 7 both fall within the category of Technology in the PESTL categorisation of
statements (see Appendix B for full PESTL categorisation).  Statement 2 refers to what the
technology can be used for and why, and is located in the Politics category, however, it is still very
technology relevant.  Furthermore, Factor 1 loads negatively on statements in the Ethical and Social
categories.  However, again this does not necessarily mean they find these statements to be
unimportant.  As one participant in Factor 1 responded to a statement regarding assessing the
impact of technology on social cohesion and solidarity (S36):
It may be wise and I am not saying this should not be done but if I would have to prioritize my
resources I would put these kinds of cards to the lowest priority basket.  It would most probably
not affect the basic functionality. And it is very difficult to assess reliably!
As such I will label Factor 1 as the “Technologists”, as their primary focus seems to be on ensuring
that ABC technologies are implemented in a way that will let them operate with the greatest amount
of success.  These Technologists are by far the largest factor grouping and number 14 individuals,
six females and eight males, representing border authorities, technology researchers, consultants
and security experts.  They see high reliability (S23) and security (S7) of systems, as most
important, they want to ensure there is a clear purpose (S2) for the technology and that this specific
technology is the best choice to achieve this purpose.  As another participant (P12) noted:
It is important to know for which needs the implementer would like to install ABC in order to
identify which is the best technology for the needs (including security aspects).
It may also be interesting for the reader to note that these Technologists also placed importance at
the +3 level on the technology being flexible enough to adapt to changing legislation and to enable
a large range of users (S29).  Aspects of the technology being attractive, ergonomic and intuitive
(S4) were also ranked at the +3 level.  The negative loadings hint at a lower importance of Ethical
aspects, with impacts in third-countries (S11) and trust in manufacturers (S19) ranking at the lowest
level (-4), along with the Societal aspects of environment (S28) and social cohesion and solidarity
(S36).  Furthermore, these technologists do not give as much importance to public participation
(S31) as the other two factors, but they do place a slightly higher emphasis on assessing new and
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innovative technologies for compliance to standards, legislation and best practices (S17).  Thus, the
Technologists are most likely the individuals who are pushing for technological change and a
greater use of ABC systems.  They rank S1 and S2 at the highest level, and this is important, as
these two statements are inherently linked10 by the fact that S2 regards the purpose of implementing
the technology in the first place (policy level), and S1 refers back to that purpose to ensure the
technology itself is the best available to achieve those aims.  This concludes the discussion of
Factor 1.  More information about how Factor 1 performed the ranking of statements can be found
in 6.Appendix A.
4.3.2 Factor 2: Humanists
The defining statements from Factor 2 are shown in Table 8 below.  Note that there are four
participants that land on this factor, but interestingly one (P18) has a negative correlation with the
defining statements of this factor.  The three positive-loading participants are from fields such as
research and academia, with one being from a border authority, while the negative-loading
participant represents a port authority.
As noted above, a negative correlation means that this factor is bipolar.  Therefore, where other
participants in the factor may have ranked the statement concerning how upgradable a technology is
(S35) towards the lowest level (-4), P18 ranked this statement at the highest level (+4).  In other
words, P18’s responses are generally reversed compared to the other participants in Factor 2.  This
factor should thus be interpreted in two ways, firstly from the point of view of those who loaded
positively, and secondly from the view of P18 who loaded negatively.
The positive view of Factor 2 places an emphasis on areas of Society as demonstrated by the
loadings on issues of assessing impacts on democratic participation (S14), investigating potential
hazards to society, individuals and the environment (S15), and ensuring there are no negative
impacts on the social cohesion of the population (S36).  Furthermore, there was also a defining
statement at the Policy level (S18), which notes that a policy should be defendable, proportional,
acceptable, and justifiable by implementers.  The defining statements which were ranked negatively
here refer mostly to aspects of the technology such as secureness from tampering (S7); the
attractiveness and ease of use of the technology (S4); flexibility to adapt to legislative changes
(S29), the clear definition of roles during the tender and procurement processes (S16); as well as
issues of upgradeability (S35); and assessing the technology on a fully-costed basis (S39).  Here it
10 The fact that these two statements are numbered consecutively is pure coincidence and the result of the random
numbering of the statements during the Q sample construction phase.
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becomes clear that S29 and S35 are somewhat related and thus this might explain their low ranking.
However, the overall picture that develops when looking at Factor 2 is that there is a greater
emphasis on the human impacts of the technology.  The picture becomes clearer when looking at
the other statements which were ranked positively for this factor (but were not necessarily defining
statements) such as data protection (S24), and ensuring legislative conformance (S33).  Therefore,
Factor 2 could be described as the “Humanists” due to their overall emphasis on the welfare of
society over the performance of the technology.  Their positive focus on Societal issues is in direct
contrast to Factor 1, and indeed Factor 2 has a negative correlation with Factor 1 (-0.08).  This
indicated that the two factors are indeed not related, or indeed compatible.
Table 8: Defining statements for Factor 2 in order of ranking, including PESTL Categories
Statement Cat* F2 (F1) (F3)
15. Potential hazards or harms (physical or psychological) that the technology
may pose to society, individuals, or the environment are important to assess.
S +4 0 -1
18. The policy behind implementation, and the technology's effects on users
and their behaviour should be morally defendable; the specific technology
systems and processes implemented should be proportional and acceptable to
addressing the problem; and the results of these efforts should be justifiable.
P +4 0 -1
14. It is wise to identify whether the technology implementation and policy
supports or undermines democratic participation or national political culture.
S +3 -3 -3
36 It would be wise to assess whether technologies might have a negative
impact on the social cohesion and solidarity of members of society.
S +3 -4 0
7. The technology should be secure in order to prevent tampering or
manipulation by unauthorised users and operators, including hacking,
tailgating, trespassing, spoofing etc.
T -2 +4 +1
4. The technology should be attractive, ergonomic, intuitive and easy to use for
all user groups (operators, end users), preferably utilising universal user
interfaces, symbols and guidance.
T -3 +3 +4
29. It is important that the technology is flexible enough to adapt to legislation
changes, and to target use by the largest possible traveller cohort:
accommodating ID card holders, partnership arrangements with other countries,
minors, visa holders, residents, and multiple biometrics etc.
T -3 +3 0
16. The tendering process should be clearly defined and state the roles and
expectations of the implementer and the technology providers, including
ownership, maintenance and supply of hardware, software, data and services.
P -4 0 0
35. It is important that the technology (Hardware and software) is easily
upgradeable or adaptable in order to remain 'state of the art'.
T -4 +2 +3
39. It would be wise to ensure the technology is assessed on a cost basis (of
purchase, operation, personnel, maintenance, availability of parts and services,
side costs, lock-in effects etc.) to ensure that value for money is being received
over the product lifetime.
T -4 0 -2
*PESTL Categories: Policy, Ethics, Society, Technology, Legal.
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The negative view of this factor is of course the complete opposite.  Thus if the positive view
(Humanists) seem to prioritise people over technology, the negatively correlated view focuses on
the importance of ensuring the technology is functional.  This means assessing the technology on
the basis of costs (S39) is important.  Likewise ensuring the technology can remain state-of-the-art
(S35) and the attractiveness and ease of use. Indeed, while one participant from the Humanist
perspective noted about S4 “[t]his is actually quite important. However, it is less important
compared to the other points”, P18 noted about S4 “[e]asy to use (sic) is the most important issue
to [get] the full benefit out of the system”.  However, issues of democratic participation (S14), and
impacts on social cohesion (S36) and identifying hazards (S15) are seen as less important than these
technological aspects.  Therefore the negatively correlated view of this factor has some
commonalities with Factor 1, for instance ranking statements about usability (S4) and security (S7)
at the (+4) level.  Yet this negative view still places an emphasis on different statements such as S35
dealing with upgradeability, which was not loaded significantly at all in Factor 1.The discussion
now turns to the third and final factor.
4.3.3 Factor 3: Concerned Pragmatists
The defining statements for Factor 3 are listed in Table 9.  Note that Factor 3 is also a bipolar factor
(see Table 5: Factor (F) Loadings and other Participant information), with three participants loading
positively, and one negatively, thus this factor is mildly bipolar.  Participant number 17 also loads
negatively on this factor, however this same participant also loads significantly on Factor 1, and
therefore that participant’s results are not included here.  Participants who load positively on this
factor represent research and academia, a port authority and a company, while those who load
negatively work with IT, while another represents a port authority.  To examine how this makes
sense we will first look at the majority positive view of Factor 3.  This Factor is by far the most
complex and despite its small size mandates a broader exploration than the first two factors in order
to clarify its focus.
Table 9: Defining Statements for Factor 3 in order of ranking, including PESTL Categories
Statement Cat* F3 (F1) (F2)
5. It is wise to consider whether an implementation respects: the rights for a
citizen to be heard before any adverse decision is taken, the obligation for the
administration to give a reason for its decision, and the citizen's right to an
effective remedy.
E +4 0 -2
10.  It is wise to consider whether the technology implementation has an impact
on the number and quality of available jobs.
S +3 -3 0
26. It is important to consider issues regarding how a technology or policy
respects the rights of equality, including non-discrimination (on the basis of
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, language, religion, political opinion,
E +3 +1 -1
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minority group affiliation, sexual orientation and so forth), as well as respecting
cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, the rights of the child, the elderly and
the disabled.
8. In my view it is important that specific groups of individuals (e.g. children,
women, elderly, unemployed, or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities), firms
or other organisations are not unreasonably affected more than others.
S +2 -1 -2
25.  The policy should be proportional and necessary for addressing the
problem
P -3 +1 +1
40. Identifying and minimising how the technology could possibly be used for
negative purposes other than those for which it was designed and implemented
is essential.
S -3 0 0
1. It must be considered whether technology is the best option available, and
has been rigorously tested to ensure it addresses the problem adequately,  to the
requirements of the implementer, and be proven more effective or efficient
than existing, or alternative technologies.
T -4 +4 -1
21. Where the technology involves user (public) interaction, the user should be
given the opportunity to provide informed consent on whether they allow their
data to be used for the explicitly stated purpose.  Alternatives should be offered
to those who do not consent.
L -4 -1 -1
*PESTL Categories: Policy, Ethics, Society, Technology, Legal.
Issues regarding the rights of individuals to be heard before adverse decisions are made about their
situation (S5), and respect for the right of equality (S26) are loaded positively in Factor 3.  Both of
these issues come under the PESTL category of Ethics.  The issue of the impact of a technology on
the availability of jobs (S10) also ranks positively here, as does the statement regarding ensuring
that the particular technology does not address impacts towards certain members of society rather
than others (S8).  One participant in particular noted that:
It is important and crucial when you implement new technologies to study which changes … [it]
will have on the operational jobs of the people who will use the new technology.
The positive focus of Factor 3 is not yet clear simply by looking at the defining statements.
Therefore, it is also worth noting the non-definitive statements that were ranked at the highest level
(+4).  These include issues of usability such as attractiveness and ergonomics (S4), ensuring high-
levels of operational reliability and fall-back options in case of failure (S23), and an emphasis on
assessing whether technology has been developed from conception to deployment using a “privacy
by design” approach (S37).
Meanwhile statements which were ranked negatively include issues of necessity and proportionality
(S25), identifying how the technology could be misused by members of the public (S40), whether
this is the best technology for the job (S1), and giving the user the opportunity to provide informed
consent (S21).  To help explain these low-ranking statements some feedback from the participants
is perhaps useful.  In regards to ensuring the technology is the best fit for the job (S1), one
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participant noted “Should a technology be rigorously tested, it will be outdated before
implementation.  Pilot testing yes, clinical testing no”.  Thus, the participant is advocating that
technology must be the best fit for the job, however they believe in a process that enables a
technology to be implemented in an expedited fashion.  In regards to statement 21 concerning
consent, it must be noted that this statement contains an internal contradiction in the sense that it
contains multiple propositions:
Where the technology involves user (public) interaction, the user should be given the
opportunity to provide informed consent on whether they allow their data to be used for the
explicitly stated purpose. Alternatives should be offered to those who do not consent.
The section in italics is indeed a second-although related-proposition that creates a situation where
someone may agree with the first, but disagree with the second part of the statement.  As one
participant from Factor 3 who ranked S21 negatively noted “sometimes it is not possible to provide
alternatives”.  Such dual-proposition statements may make interpretation of results more difficult
and thus, according to some researchers, should be avoided (Watts & Stenner 2005, p. 87).
However, this statement somehow managed to slip by the researcher’s attention in both the piloting
and the final pre-check of the statements, and was only noticed after the first two Q sorts had been
received.  Yet it is again worth noting that negatively ranked statements simply imply less
importance compared to others.  In this case, it may be that obtaining consent is important, but
providing alternatives is not.  The statements ranked negatively at the lowest level (-4) which were
not defining statements included impacts on the natural environment (S28), and assessing whether
the technology has unintended effects on non-involved third parties (S30).
Factor 3 thus seems to be mixed, yet there is a strong focus on some rights such as the right to be
heard before an adverse decision is taken (S5), and equality (S26), there is a focus on protecting
privacy through ethical design practices (S37), safeguarding jobs (S10), and ensuring society groups
are not disproportionately affected by the technology (S8).  With this in mind, it is possible to say
that Factor 3 represents individuals with a focus Societal and Ethical aspects, but also a minor
emphasis on aspects of Technology.  They are a completely different group in comparison with
Factor 2 (correlation of just -0.03: see
Table 6), yet they do have some similarities with Factor 1 (correlation of 0.22), however this is still
a low correlation that demands a factor in its own right.  Factor 3 could possibly be described as a
grouping of “Concerned Pragmatists”.  They are pragmatic in the sense that they emphasise the
importance of the functionality of the technology, but yet are concerned with ethical and social
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issues such as rights, and privacy.  This can be seen in one participant’s comments about the
privacy-by-design (S37) principle:
If the technology is built with privacy-by-design, it not only enables the end-users (travellers) to
trust the technology, but enables the authorities to not misuse the systems by accident (or, in a
worst case, on purpose).
Moreover, in regards to S4 on the usability aspects of technology such as attractiveness and
ergonomics: “if the technology can't be easily used it won't be used”.
The picture of this group is now somewhat clearer; however, there are also the two participants who
have the reverse view of this bipolar factor.  Participant 15 loaded negatively on this factor and thus
holds a view which prioritises ensuring the technology is the best one for the job (S1):“It is
appropriate to strive to 'get it right first time' and avoid unnecessary delays or failures”.  Although
this same statement was ranked at opposite ends of the extremes (-4 for the positive view and +4 for
the reversed view) this is not actually directly contradictory the positive view, as previously noted
by one participant’s comments on ensuring technology is piloted rather than clinically assessed.
The difference here comes down to the level of testing.  Getting it right the first time means
thorough testing, but this is also the point of piloting a technology.  The reversed view of Factor 3
would also place less emphasis on ensuring society groups are not disproportionately affected by
the technology (S8), and less emphasis on issues of equality (S26) and the privacy-by design
principle (S37).  They do, however, load more positively on issues of consent (S21) and assessing
whether the technology could be misused by members of the public (S40).
Factor 3 is thus a bipolar factor that deserves further exploration.  The views expressed here seem
somewhat contradictory on first examination, yet when the feedback statements of the participants
are taken into account, more clarity is obtained.  The participants loading positively on this factor
seem to have interpreted and ranked statements quite strictly.  This does however mean that there is
a greater need to explore not only their ranking scores, but also their feedback.
4.3.4 Participants who did not load significantly on any factor
There were also two participants, P22 and P25, who did not load significantly on any factor at the
p>.01 level (see Table 5 above).  One of these participants noted that they did not have much
background knowledge of the issues covered by the research, and thus this may explain their non-
loading.  However, it is quite common in Q Methodology that a minority of participants do not load
on any of the factors.  This simply means their responses were so different from all the others that
the only way for them to land on a factor was if they were the only participant in that factor.  This
however, would not have very good explanatory value.  Further research with a wider sampling
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may reveal that these individuals do in fact fall into certain factors; however, this is outside the
scope of this thesis.
This concludes the explanation of the three factors as identified in this research.  In summary these
three factors have been described as: Technologists who emphasise the importance of functionality;
the Humanists who emphasis human impacts and the welfare of society over functionality of
technology; and finally the Concerned Pragmatists who are concerned with both social and ethical
issues such as rights and impacts on employment, but are also focused on ensuring the technology
does what it needs to do.  It must be noted that these are rough categorisations based on the data at
hand, and are subject to interpretation.  However, I believe that this is the best description of these
groups at this point.  Further research should aim to clarify these viewpoints.
4.3.5 Participants and Factors
It is interesting to note that although this study examined individuals who self-reported as
performing similar tasks, not all of these participants landed on the same factor.  For example, only
two of the three individuals who reported as a border authority landed on Factor 1.  The three
individuals who reported themselves as working for a port operator landed in two different factors,
one in Factor 1, and two in Factor 3.  However, one in Factor 3 was positively correlated with that
factor (P24), while the other was negatively correlated (P17).  What this demonstrates is that
although individuals may self-report as being from similar professional backgrounds, their
subjective views can often be quite different.
Figure 2: Pie chart illustrating participants per factor as a percentage
Factor 1
60 %
Factor 2
16 %
Factor 3
16 %
No Factor
8 %
Participants by Factor
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Furthermore, the pie chart in Figure 2
Figure 2: Pie chart illustrating participants per factor as a percentage gives an indication of the
number of participants in each factor.  This is an important illustration to take into account when
considering the relative weights of each factor.  It should be noted that this may not necessarily be
representative of society as a whole.  As mentioned earlier, Q does not aim to provide statistically
representative results that can be generalised across a population; it only aims to illuminate what
perspectives might exist within a population.  What can be said is that in this study around 60
percent of participants loaded significantly on Factor 1, while only 16 percent loaded on Factors 2
and 311.  Additionally, some of those loading on Factors 2 and 3 loaded negatively, which again
means their views were the inverse of the positive view of the factor.  Although this may not be
statistically relevant when extrapolated across a larger group of stakeholders, caution should
nonetheless be taken when aiming to develop balanced stakeholder interactions such as workshops,
especially if social and ethical issues are to be taken into account.
4.3.6 The Statements: a discussion
Consensus	statements	
There were also a number of statements that were ranked similarly across all three factors.  These
four statements, shown below in Table 10, indicate that there were levels of agreement between the
different factors, and were non-significant at p>.01.  The most notable statements are those
regarding data protection (S24) which was ranked positively, and public demand (S34) which was
ranked negatively.
Table 10: Consensus statements
Statement Cat* F1 F2 F3
6.  The conformity of the technology to relevant compliance standards
and certifications (health and safety, security, environment, privacy,
technical etc.) is important to assess.
L +2 +1 +1
20.  In my view, a technology implementation, and associated
processes,  should abide by the right  to  respect  for  private  and family
life, home and communications.
E -1 0 0
24.  It is necessary to consider how, and what personal data is
gathered, stored and transmitted by the technology, and whether this is
according to regulations pertaining to the protection of data; and
whether individuals will have the right of access and rectification of
data.
L +3 +4 +2
11 The results of P17 who loaded on two factors (positively on Factor 1 and negatively on Factor 3) have only been
included in Factor 1.
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34.   Before  a  policy  is  implemented  it  is  best to assess if  there  is  a
clear public demand and need for the implementation of the proposed
technology/ies, or whether this is a political solution to a political
problem.
P -2 -2 -2
*PESTL Categories: Policy, Ethics, Society, Technology, Legal.
Statement 6 was shown to be only mildly important, despite one participant’s lengthy response:
Standards and certifications are crucial in any technological deployment. Efforts to ensure
conformance in a constructive and consolidated manner can help to ensure consideration of
relevant areas and are therefore worthwhile in themselves.  They also breed trust and
transparency in any development. Furthermore, conformance can aid harmonisation, important
in ABC system design. Some standards may also become legally binding even if not so at the
time of deployment, and hence conformance from the beginning of deployment efforts is a good
goal.
Statement 20 on the other hand was ranked far more neutrally, which was surprising considering
this is a freedom as noted in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(Official Journal of the European Union 2012).  However, this may have something to do with the
positive ranking of S24.
In terms of data protection (S24), one participant noted:
It is important that the individuals remain at the core of the process. Therefore, the impact of
the technology on their data and the way it will be used shall be considered.
While another simply said: “Big brother or not…that is the question”.  The emphasis on data
protection over privacy was an interesting one.  However, it could simply be that participants
assume that if data protection regulations are followed, then concerns related to privacy will be
minimised.  Nissenbaum (2010, pp. 104-5) in her seminal work on privacy, notes that while a lot of
individuals claim they want privacy, when given options between privacy and other goods, people
almost always choose the other good.  These goods usually focus on providing convenience,
efficiency, financial savings, connectivity, and safety (Nissenbaum 2010, p. 105).  Thus, perhaps
these results indicate that individuals are willing to forego privacy for convenience, just so long as
their personal data is protected.  The other alternative of course is that participants see no privacy
concerns involved with ABC systems that process personal and biometric data.  However this
position would be strongly debated by the contributing authors in Campisi’s (2013a) book “Security
and privacy in biometrics”.  Some common arguments are presented in the book, such as that
biometrics, unlike passwords, cannot be changed if compromised (Campisi 2013a, pp. v-vi).
Furthermore, the use of some forms of biometrics may reveal sensitive information about an
individual’s health or personality (ibid.).  The use of one biometric may also lead to others being
gradually increased such as identifying an individual by gait, or tracking individuals through spaces
using facial recognition, all of which may occur without explicit knowledge or consent (ibid.).
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Such minor changes are related to the concept of function creep (S22), and also flow into the issue
of the level of desirability and need for technology, which leads us to the next statement on public
demand.
Statement 34 regarding public demand was also ranked surprisingly low, with a number of
comments justify the ranking in this way:
Public demand does not always go hand in hand with changes/developments necessary for
society, especially if 'society' refers to multi-nation community such as European Union.
In addition:
Public demand is not a valid driver for border security, and I also see many other reasons than
public demand or political problem (sic).
Therefore, there are some important lessons here about what all three factors agreed on.  Although
the Frontex Best Practice Operational Guidelines (Frontex 2012a) note the dangers of politically
driven ABC deployments, the results of this research do not necessarily denote this as an important
aspect to consider.  Furthermore the importance of assessing whether a technology is “simply
looking for problems to solve, rather than responding to a genuine need” has been expressed by a
number of experts (see European Commission 2014b, p. 30).  However, as shown by the comments
to this statement, a number of participants clearly believe that certain aspects of security should be
above the level of public demand.  This may come back to a distinction between what seems to be a
related cycle between security research and the social environment.  Burgess (2012) notes that
security professionals work within a field of social assumptions, structures and values, and their
work aims to develop solutions for the perceived threats and dangers which exist in that
environment.  Technological change, however, directly influences change in the social
environment, that is, in structures, customs and values, and thus while new technologies may
overcome old problems and fears, they also bring with them new fears and risks (Burgess 2012).
Although the statement about public demand (S34) was ranked quite low, the statement about
public engagement (S31, see Appendix A) was ranked higher (-2, +3, +2 in F1, F2, and F3
respectively).  There are numerous ways to interpret this information.  For example, it might be that
individuals feel that the relevant authority should be able to propose to implement a technology, just
so long as the proposal is subject to a period of public debate.  The authority may be seen as the best
actor to determine need, not other societal actors.  However, it may be pertinent to realise that not
all societal actors are represented in public engagement.  Discourses on certain topics may favour
certain outcomes and be dominated by certain perspectives; such an issue is identified by Russell,
Vanclay and Aslin who note that there is:
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a tendency to regard technology as essentially linked to ‘progress’, without acknowledging the
political nature of progress and how implicit social goals that underpin technology development
are associated with particular interests and actors (Russell, Vanclay & Aslin 2010, p. 110).
Furthermore, Nissenbaum (2010, p. 161) writes that changes due to transformations in information
systems and technologies are often thrust upon people and societies “without a careful evaluation of
harms and benefits, perturbations in social and cultural values, and whether and by whom these
changes are needed or wanted”.  Furthermore, she likens these gradual changes like the slow but
constant movements of the hands on a clock, nearly imperceptible in real time, yet become obvious
over a longer period (Nissenbaum 2010, p. 161).  An approach that links security research with
societal needs helps to overcome these issues, and ensures that there is a link between the needs of
society and the security of the state.  As Hempel et al. (2013, pp. 742-3) argue, security decision
making is based on normative values, and thus “how decisions are made impact on how societal and
ethical implications unfold”.  A decision-making process therefore, should be as inclusive as
possible and involve not only security experts, but also other societal actors.  That being said, this
research involved numerous stakeholders from varying backgrounds, and yet only seven
participants ranked this statement (S34) at +1 or above, and only one of these ranked it at the +4
level.  This participant provided the following explanation:
Because it should be first assessed whether the new technology is necessary and whether the
issue it is supposed to solve cannot be solved differently, e.g. with existing technologies or
personnel.
In summary, these consensus statements show that there were similarities between the three
identified factors, some of which are quite interesting.  Further investigation using a wider
participant sample may reveal these to be endemic to the population, or simply related to
individuals involved with security research.
Other	issues	
Aside from the issue of dual propositions discussed above in the explanation of Factor 3, another
interesting issue was noted with the statements.  The initial purpose of S19 “Technology developers
are the best actors to ensure their products are compatible with existing laws and ethical norms
from conception to the final stages of production and implementation” was to represent the concept
of responsible technology development, which is linked to the concept of Responsible Research and
Innovation (RRI).  However, this statement was not described sufficiently, and thus became
somewhat of a reversed statement whereby a negative response indicates agreement with the
concept of RRI.  The RRI concept aims for a transparent and interactive innovation process which
includes consideration of the ethical acceptability, sustainability and social desirability of
innovative technologies, from inception, through design, and into production (Owen, Macnaghten
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& Stilgoe 2012).  RRI is a process which aligns research and innovation processes and outcomes
with the values, needs and expectations of society, and should be seen as an interactive process
(European Commission 2015b).  However, the majority of participants in the study ranked S19
towards the lower end of the spectrum, thus resulting in a -4, 0, -4 loading on Factors 1, 2 and 3
respectively.  Therefore, while the intention was to provide a statement that the researcher
anticipated to rank positively, the reality was that participants viewed this statement quite
negatively due to how the statement was worded, and many of them noted in the comments section
that they do not trust technology manufacturers to make ethical decisions.  However, even though
the statement was not ranked positively, it still performed its desired function as a negatively ranked
or reversed statement.  As one participant noted “Based on personal experience, technology
developers may not be interested in ethical norms nor regulation at all (unless they have a clear
impact in their business).” A number of participants agreed to further discuss their results, and
when given a short paragraph explaining the concept of responsible technology development they
were asked if this knowledge would change how they ranked S19.  The paragraph given was the
following:
… during the design process it has to be made sure that technology is designed in a way that
does not hinder or preclude certain legally compatible organisational options.  Quite the
contrary, the producer should work towards promoting certain organisational options which
benefit basic rights….it is imperative that producers concern themselves with organisational
aspects and possibilities of the later use on the level of technical objectives and account for them
in the development process (SIAM 2011, p. 15).
One individual, after reading the paragraph noted that he would probably now rank S19 around +3.
Another also decided that they would adjust the ranking from -2 to +1.  No results were actually
modified, the main point here is that the interpretation of different statements is very subjective, and
can change according to a given context.  What we end up with however is a ranking for S19 that
demonstrates a lack of trust in technology manufacturers to design products in an ethically and
legally sound manner.  The responses overwhelmingly pointed to technology developers were not
the best actors to ensure their products conformed with laws or norms, they were not objective, or
perhaps they did not have the legal expertise to understand the implications of their technology.
The statement indeed performed its task in revealing perceptions on responsible technology
development, but just not in the way it was originally intended.  If anything became clear from the
results of this statement, it is that there must be a greater transparency in technology development,
including interactive processes with multiple stakeholders along the entire design, manufacturing
and deployment chains.
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The discussion here draws attention back to the way statements must be carefully worded and
described in Q Methodology.  Although the researcher understands the context in which s/he wrote
the statement, the participants are usually without such context.  Indeed, one participant mentioned
that they would have appreciated more context along with the statements in order to rank them more
efficiently.  This could perhaps have been done by providing truncated statements along with a
paragraph explaining the context behind each.  However, this would also have increased the Q sort
duration.  Nonetheless it is worthy of consideration for future studies which may involve non-
experts, as another participant noted “the survey would be too tricky to an[s]wer for an "average
traveller" if that would be necessary”.  Therefore, the statements could be made less complex if
they are accompanied by short, context-giving paragraphs.  In this way, non-experts could possibly
perform the Q sort process, which would also provide the traveller’s perspective.
Furthermore, it should be noted that while certain statements may have been ranked negatively, they
are still important to assess.  For example, respect for certain rights such as privacy is important to
consider, despite its low ranking here.  The illustration of backscatter, or “naked”, body scanners in
airports given in the introduction to this thesis, is a clear example of how a failure to consider issues
of privacy can be extremely expensive.  Furthermore, just because an issue is considered necessary
due to legal reasons or certain norms, it does not mean its impact should not be assessed. As noted
by Hempel and Lammerant (2015, p. 37) “an impact on a freedom which is considered legal can
still be considered annoying by a traveller and therefore minimizing it can be important in order to
improve acceptance.”
4.4 Using the results to assess key issues
The key aims of reducing the number of criteria, supporting the selection with academic literature,
and developing a more concise categorisation of criteria have already been addressed above through
the methodology of Q.  In this section, I will look at the remaining three key issues, which are:
developing a common scale of measurement, reducing overlapping criteria and allowing certain
criteria to be weighted more heavily (so-called killer criteria).
4.4.1 Common scale of measurement
In this study I utilised the bipolar (-4 to +4) scale of measurement common in Q Methodology.  A
key issue in the ValueSec project revolved around complex value functions, designed to translate
qualitative assessment into quantitative results (see Blobner 2013a, p. 22).  This research attempted
to overcome this issue by utilising a research methodology (Q) whose strength lay in performing
just such tasks.  In this research, all criteria could be assigned whichever value the Q sort participant
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deemed appropriate.  This works well in such research, however, it must be noted that the aims of
the ValueSec project were far more complex.  The issues of the complexity of value functions
persisted despite the participation of numerous experts in fields such as quantitative research and
risk management.  In short, I do not claim to have solved the issues which ValueSec faced, I simply
note that for the current purposes a common scale of measurement was utilised effectively to
convert qualitative assessments into quantitative data, which are then able to be interpreted in a
qualitative narrative.  The usefulness of these results in contributing towards a toolset is yet to be
seen, and is a topic to be applied in further research
4.4.2 Minimising overlapping criteria
The issue of overlapping criteria has previously been discussed in Chapter 3.1.2.  However, a
further discussion relating to the feedback received from the questionnaire is also beneficial here.
To briefly recap, minimising overlapping criteria was explained to be quite a difficult task.  Many
of the criteria have some minor overlaps, but these sometimes occur at different levels.  For
example the statements given below referrring to the security of the techbology (S7) under the
category of Technology, and the statement regarding misuse (S40) under the category of Society are
inherently related:
7.  The technology should be secure in order to prevent tampering or manipulation by
unauthorised users and operators, including hacking, tailgating, trespassing, spoofing etc.
40.  Identifying and minimising how the technology could possibly be used for negative
purposes other than those for which it was designed and implemented is essential.
The first of these looks specifically at security requirements of the technology to ensure it is safe
and secure once it is implemented.  This is directly related to the aims of the second (S40) however,
in that this second statement aims to address other possible areas where that particular technology
could be utilised by members of the public for negative purposes.  In a sense, the identification and
minimisation performed in S40 should determine the security response in S7.  This is a subtle
difference, and perhaps requires further consideration about whether both statements are necessary.
However, it is also sometimes the case in Q that two similar, but slightly different statements are
included in a Q sample to test reliability.  Additionally, the following statement from the Society
category is inherently linked with the former two, but yet addresses slightly different issues:
15.  Potential hazards or harms (physical or psychological) that the technology may pose to
society, individuals, or the environment are important to assess.
With so many criteria addressing slightly different aspects of the technology, it is important to
understand that overlapping areas are always going to persist.  The main objective should be to
reduce the amount of overlapping, or at least understand which areas overlap.  However, as
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previously mentioned, Q can handle a certain amount of overlap in statements.  Thus understanding
which statements overlap and how this might influence the impact assessment process should be
examined further.
The assessment of overlapping criteria will continue beyond the timeframe of this thesis.  It is
important that the criteria are able to be assessed for overlap also in terms of the contents of the
remaining tools in the toolset: CBA and RRA.  There are a number of criteria that may also overlap
with these areas, for example issues of cost-effectiveness (S39) and ensuring the technology is
secure (S7) overlap with CBA and RRA respectively.  However, these can also be seen as important
issues where qualitative responses may contribute towards better understanding.  Rather than just a
quantitative process of assessing these two issues, qualitative feedback from stakeholders about
their perceptions may contribute to a better understanding of whether or not the technology is really
acceptable at the assessed levels.  As noted by Karafyllis (2009, p. 94), there is an important
distinction to be made of the quantitative or analytical assessment for feasibility, and the qualitative
assessment for desirability.  One involves statistics, and data, the other takes into consideration
social dynamics and psychology.  Both are useful, and both should be used.  Other items with
potential overlap with RRA are issues of privacy (S20) and data protection (S24) to which Hempel
and Lammerant argue about impact assessments:
Impact assessments in the area of data protection, privacy and surveillance require an
interdisciplinary cooperation for obvious reasons. The developments at stake are too complex to
follow one single approach (Hempel & Lammerant 2015, p. 138).
Thus, multiple approaches to such important issues are needed.  The interaction of multiple
stakeholders provides multiple perspectives, and in turn results in what Hempel & Lammerant
(2015) “negotiated knowledge”.  This negotiation of perspectives and opinions from stakeholders
and experts in turn should provide better outcomes for technology assessments.  However,
challenges still remain:
The challenge with the integration of perspectives is to avoid turning them into a hierarchy with
one dominant perspective and the second as auxiliary, and to make sure that both perspectives
inform the assessment methodology and complement each other (Hempel & Lammerant 2015,
p. 139).
Criteria from QCA that overlap with other areas of the toolset should not therefore be seen as a
negative duplication of the assessment process, but rather as an opportunity to provide
complimentary feedback on the related issue.  However, in order to keep the QCA process as user-
friendly as possible the number of complimentary overlaps should be considered thoroughly.  The
process of identifying overlapping criteria is expected to also be case-specific, and thus the
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researcher suggests further examination of the criteria in the context of the technology being
assessed.
4.4.3 Killer Criteria and negotiating the importance of impacts
The final task in developing the criteria set was to identify whether any criteria were of such
importance that if not addressed adequately, they could potentially lead to a termination of an
assessment.  In other words, when translating the statements developed in this research into criteria
to assess a technology implementation, one could perhaps assign a minimum threshold to criteria
dealing with legal obligations, or possibly adherence to fundamental human rights.  If, after the
assessment of the proposed implementation has taken place the thresholds have not been met, the
assessor would recommend termination of the project, hence the name killer criteria.
During the research planning phase there was the hope that the final results of the Q sorts could be
used as somewhat of a gauge to determine whether any such killer criteria existed.  The thinking
was that any criteria that was consistently ranked positively, or for example, had an overall average
ranking of +2 or above could potentially be marked as a killer criteria.  An average of +2 would
mean that a large majority of participants would need to rank the statement positively, and thus
there would be somewhat of a consensus that the particular statement was important.  However,
again it must be remembered that Q Methodology ranks statements according to their relationship
with each other, and thus determining one that is more important than another can be problematic,
as the statement would be taken out of its participant-ranked context.  Additionally, it must be
emphasised that calculating the average ranks of statements is not a method commonly used in Q
Methodology.  That being said, the only statement that even came close to an average of +2 was S7:
“The technology should be secure in order to prevent tampering or manipulation by unauthorised
users and operators, including hacking, tailgating, trespassing, spoofing etc.” with an average of
+1.96.  The next statement to come close was S23: “It is essential to ensure the technology meets an
extremely high level of operational availability, and fall-back options are developed to deal with
any unexpected unavailability” with an average of +1.64.  However both of these statements refer
to criteria (Security and Availability respectively) which are generally covered by best practice
technical and operational guidelines such as those developed by Frontex (Frontex 2015a, 2015b).
Both aspects are also thoroughly discussed in the recent Smart Borders pilot (see for example
European Commission 2014c).
Therefore, the recommendation here is that killer criteria may be an option left to either the
implementer or the assessor.  Different technologies in different environments for different
implementers may lead to vastly different requirements, and thus it may be best to assign such
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minimum thresholds on a per-case basis.  After all, as Hempel and Lammerant (2015, p. 125) note
about performing impact assessments:
The knowledge produced, i.e. the final assessment output, is not a simple truth about an impact
of a considered project.  It itself is a result of the widespread negotiations on what has been seen
and conceptualized as a relevant impact in the first place. It is thus an outcome of value
discussions and interests.
As such assessments are negotiations; it may be better to allow the good judgment of the assessing
party to determine what is and is not an acceptable level of impact.  Not only that, but the method of
assessment as advocated by this research and others noted above in chapter two involve active
stakeholder involvement in the assessment process (see Hempel & Lammerant 2015, p. 137;
Russell, Vanclay & Aslin 2010; Schot 2001; Schot & Rip 1997; Vanclay 2003).  Thus it is not only
the assessor and technology developer who need to negotiate on what would constitute killer
criteria, but ideally, all relevant stakeholders should be involved in giving their opinion over what
is and is not an acceptable level of impact, and whether the technology in question falls within the
acceptable limits.
4.5 General discussion
Throughout this thesis, the importance of including relevant stakeholders in any assessment of
technology has been noted.  I would like to conclude this analysis of results with a discussion on the
usefulness of such impact assessments and make recommendations as to how to go forward.  It has
been noted above that using qualitative assessments of technology should be an interactive process
involving multiple stakeholders.  This research attempted to identify the perceptions that exist
surrounding ABC systems, and did so by inviting multiple stakeholders to participate.  Although
based on a review of the literature, the statements developed for the Q sorting phase of this research
were noted to be subjective.  In further assessments it would be wise to look at the criteria to ensure
relevant areas have been covered, and to add to the list of criteria if needed.  It is well noted that the
ability of participants to contribute to such research is perhaps limited by what they are given to
work with, as Schot and Rip (1997, p. 43) describe: “when questionnaires ask only about comfort,
speed and acceleration, consumers seem to want only more comfort, speed and acceleration
capacity in new cars.”  Therefore, it would be wise to consider whether other relevant issues
(criteria) need to be accounted for.
4.5.1 Using Q and HTMLQ
Q Methodology provides an output for the issue of identifying other factors in the sense that
participants are also asked to describe why they performed sorting tasks the way that they did,
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giving the opportunity to provide further feedback.  Participants are also encouraged to rank
statements in the way they interpret them.  It was noted earlier that the Q sorting process can be
performed either in person or remotely, and that a number of tools exist to support the remote
performing of Q sorts.  In this research, the online Q sorting programme HTMLQ was utilised.
This had the benefit of being accessible to all participants whenever they were available to perform
the task.  Furthermore, it reduced the time the researcher needed to spend instructing participants
during the sorting process.  However, there were also a number of issues identified with utilising an
online programme.  Firstly because of the way the programme operates, it was possible for
participants to skip certain important steps such as the feedback process (why they ranked
statements under the +/- 4 columns).  Despite being marked as mandatory, the HTMLQ programme
could not differentiate whether a participant had given a detailed response or whether they had
simply hit the spacebar once in each feedback box and moved on to the next step.  Such blank
responses, while unhelpful, were not totally unexpected.  It must be noted however that only three
participants left all eight feedback boxes empty, while three others completed only half.  Individuals
these days are time-poor, and responding in detail to why you ranked a particular item in such a
way requires effort.  An interesting piece of data is that the average time for performing the entire
HTMLQ process was 58 minutes, with the quickest sort being performed in less than 20 minutes,
while the longest took almost three hours.  However such a long duration is not necessarily
indicative of the amount of continuous effort involved with performing the sort, the participant
could very well have been distracted or busy with other tasks and completed different steps of the
sort between other tasks.,
Overall, the reduction in costs of performing an online versus in-person Q sort may not necessarily
be useful if participants do not complete the entire feedback process.  In this research the selection
of participants was performed using somewhat of an “open-invitation” method whereby they were
asked to participate if they so wished.  In some other Q studies participation is confirmed
beforehand, and thus the researcher knows exactly who will participate, and possibly even when
they will perform the Q sort.  If utilised with an online sorting process, the latter method would
undoubtedly contribute to both a reduction in costs and greater feedback.  Ensuring the researcher is
able to follow up on Q sorts when they are performed online is beneficial to the research; however
this must also be balanced with privacy concerns.  In this thesis, participants were given the option
to contribute anonymously, and many chose that option.  However, a small number did contact the
researcher and offer to provide extra feedback if needed.  The balance between obtaining reliable
results that are able to be followed up and ensuring privacy is a tricky one, especially when the
participants might be known to each other due to a close working relationship.  This was the case
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here, as many participants work within the FastPass and BODEGA projects, and this is also why the
country data is not connected with other participant information in the data analysis section.
As for Q itself, the ongoing use of this methodology for building upon the current research should
be considered.  The method may be able to contribute to providing a translation of qualitative
feedback from stakeholders about the impact of technology, into quantitative data.  Q might allow
technology assessments to become more interactive and complimentary with other tools such as
CBA and RRA.  However, the process of forced sorting in Q may need to be reconsidered for such
processes.  Participants should be allowed to rank statements in any order and at any rank they wish
to ensure their specific view of the technology at hand are accurately represented.  This is entirely
acceptable within some schools of Q, but it remains to be seen whether another ranking method
would provide results in a more efficient manner.
4.5.2 Recommendations for using the criteria described in this research.
In order to advance further in developing a toolset for assessing technology implementation it is
wise to consider the existing literature on the topic.  One of the themes that keeps appearing in this
research is that any assessment of technology must involve a wide range of stakeholders.  The
involvement of multiple stakeholders ensures varying viewpoints are taken into account through
acts of negotiation and renegotiation, preferably throughout the design phase of a particular
technology.  That being said, not all assessments of technology are performed during these stages,
many are performed only before a planned implementation.  It is the latter case where the criteria
defined in this research are most suited.  A number of cautionary remarks should be added to this,
reflecting what a number of authors (Ball et al. 2006; Hempel et al. 2013) have already noted about
such assessments.  Firstly, such assessments should not simply be check-box exercises performed to
improve public image and give a score at the end (Ball et al. 2006).  Doing so could possibly be
more dangerous, both for the assessor and for the one being assessed, should it be revealed that
there is an underlying problem that should have been detected but was not.  It should therefore be
more than a “philosophical exercise” (Hempel et al. 2013, p. 752), it should be a genuine attempt to
understand the impact of the technology on society.  Additionally, these types of assessments
cannot be viewed as a “one-size-fits-all” process; there is a need to tailor each assessment to the
specific technology (Ball et al. 2006, p. 92; Hempel et al. 2013, p. 752).  Finally, the approach
described in this thesis is not designed to replace other forms of Impact Assessments (IAs); on the
contrary, it is designed to support more intense forms of impact assessment by creating a link
between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the assessment.  It is more than likely issues will
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be raised during this initial process that may warrant a more thorough investigation, and such issues
should be comprehensively explored.
Ideally, however, such assessments should be taking place alongside technology development:
there needs to be a greater consideration of the social issues associated with technological
developments, and that this understanding of the social context of technology needs to occur
alongside the development of the technology, and not as a post-hoc assessment of the social
consequences of technology (Russell, Vanclay & Aslin 2010, p. 115)
With this in mind, the results of this research provide a starting point for a discussion on what
particular actors place an emphasis on in assessments of new technology.  The results have shown
that there are a number of different perspectives that exist, and it is possible that this understanding
can be beneficial when developing a plan for assessing a particular technology.  For example,
knowing that there is a perspective that emphasises certain criteria at a certain level may help
identify where a particular technology may not reach that particular threshold, and thus where
improvements may need to be made.  However, in doing so it would be wise to use the highest
existing threshold, not the lowest.  Common sense and good judgement must also abound in such
assessments, after all, the assessor’s role is to mediate the negotiation and renegotiation of
knowledge between stakeholders (Hempel & Lammerant 2015), not to simply perform a task for a
client.
The set of criteria developed in this research is by no means exhaustive.  It is expected that the
process of defining and developing the criteria will be an ongoing one.  The criteria could be
developed further by rephrasing the statements into questions, and using these questions in
stakeholder groups to assess a particular technology.  Furthermore, a focus on a slightly different
technology may require a consideration of whether other criteria should be included in the
assessment process.
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5. Conclusion
5.1 Research objectives: Summary of key areas of investigation
This thesis aimed to develop a set of criteria to be used in assessing automated border control
technology.  These criteria were to be developed from previous work performed in EU projects, but
with a focus on border control technology.  To address this task the current research was broken
down into six key areas of investigation, namely:
1. Review and reduce the number of criteria, ensuring criteria are relevant to the current
research topic
2. Support criteria selection with academic literature
3. Develop concise categories for criteria
4. Implement a common scale of measurement for all criteria
5. Reduce overlapping criteria
6. Allow certain criteria (e.g. legal) to be weighted more heavily (killer criteria)
These areas were not firm problems that required solving, but rather areas that were noted as key
concerns from the original project that required further investigation.
Areas number one and two were approached through the research method utilised in the project.  Q
Methodology (Q) required an identification of relevant discussions surrounding the topic, which
also meant an investigation of the relevant academic literature.  Using the criteria sets available in
public deliverables from the ValueSec and DESSI projects, the researcher set about identifying
which of these were observable in the relevant literature.  The criteria were translated into
statements for the purposes of assessment with Q.  This process resulted in a preliminary criteria set
of 46 statements, which was later refined to 40 through a pretesting or “piloting” of the Q sorting
process with colleagues from VTT.
The third key area was also addressed through the piloting process; however, it became obvious that
assigning the criteria to categories was quite a subjective process as each participant created
different categories and relations between the statements.  Therefore, the PESTLE approach was
modified for the purposes of this research, resulting in the categories of Policy, Ethics, Society,
Technology and Legal (PESTL).  These categories, and the way the criteria are organised within
them, are in no way perfect, yet they performed the functional task of organising the criteria, and
assisted in the interpretation of research results.
The fourth area was addressed through the research methodology.  Q allowed the researcher to
assign almost any value to the Q sorting template, yet the requirements of the research demanded a
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scale from negative to positive.  Initially, scales of -3 to +3, 1 to 7, and simply “-” to “+” (for the
extreme poles) were considered, however, each of these had drawbacks and after the piloting phase
a scale of -4 to +4 was selected.  The method of instruction was to rank the statements in the order
of importance, from negative to positive respectively: Most Unimportant to Most Important.  This
scale was chosen to ensure a “flatter” distribution of nine columns rather than seven in the previous
options.  Using a negative to positive scale did have its drawbacks, requiring detailed explanation
that ranking a statement negatively did not mean it was unimportant by itself, but rather that the
statement was simply less important than another placed to its right.  The common scale of
measurement used in Q allows the qualitative nature of the participants’ ranking processes to be
converted into a quantitative value, thus allowing the researcher to analyse the data with computer
applications.  The scale of measurement used in this research worked extremely well for the aims,
however, this is not to say the same method would necessarily solve the problems identified in the
ValueSec project.  It is however an option worthy of consideration.
The fifth and sixth areas were an ongoing process throughout the entire research.  Indeed, from start
to finish these two areas were constantly being assessed.  However, ultimately they are both rather
subjective processes and very much task dependent.  The fact that criteria overlap is quite obvious
in the results above.  However, it is difficult to define strict boundaries between these criteria, and
in a sense, the overlaps help to cover different levels of concern.  For example, ensuring that a
technology is secure (S7, Technology) is related to protecting society from misuse of that
technology (S40, Society), which is related to identifying the process of function creep (S22,
Policy), which ultimately refers back to the original stated purpose of the technology (S2, Policy).
Indeed, it is likely that this process could go on and link a majority of the statements.
Allowing criteria to be weighted more heavily was noted to be technically possible.  However, it is
recommended that the assessor, in consultation with stakeholders, performs this process in order to
ensure the relevant criteria are selected as the so-called minimum threshold “killer criteria”.
Furthermore, this task may be complicated by the involvement of multiple actors who have varying
opinions of what constitutes a minimum threshold for particular criteria.  As the results of the
research demonstrate, there are only a small number of statements that all three factor groupings
ranked similarly.
In summary, all six key areas of investigation have been addressed by this research.  The findings
demonstrate that Q is a useful tool for such a process, as it allowed a number of tasks to be
performed as a part of the standard research methodology.  The following section is a summary of
the results obtained through the Q research process.
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5.2 Research results: Summary of findings
The previous section summarised the findings related to the key areas of investigation for this
research.  This section will summarise the research results and subsequent findings, before
concluding with recommendations for future investigation.
In total 25 participants performed the sorting of statements using the online Q sorting programme
HTMLQ.  These participants were shown to be from numerous professional backgrounds including
border authorities, consultants, researchers in multiple areas, non-profit groups and companies.  An
analysis of the Q sort data with the PQMethod application utilising Principle Components Analysis
(PCA) and the researcher’s own judgement in rotating scores, three main Factors were identified.
Participants in Factor 1 were described as “Technologists” due to their positive emphasis on the
functional aspects of the technology, and the Legal considerations pertaining to those functions.
These technologists placed a lower importance on issues of Ethics and Society as defined by the
PESTL categories.  Factor two were described as the “Humanists” due to their greater emphasis on
issues falling under the Society and Ethics categories, and their negative emphasis on aspects under
Technology.  Factor 3 was named as “Concerned Pragmatists” who seem to be emphasising similar
aspects under the Technology category as Factor 1. However, they also place importance on areas
of Ethics and Society that were overlooked by Factor 2.  Factors 2 and 3 were also bipolar in nature,
meaning that at least one participant had the reverse view of the factor.  It was noted that the factors
were not even in the number of participants which they contain, and thus while caution must be
taken when interpreting the statistical significance of this; it is perhaps a key point to remember
when developing stakeholder interactions discussing social and ethical issues.
The results of the research also demonstrated that a number of statements were ranked similarly
across all three factors.  These were interesting because they exposed what appeared to be subtle
contradictions.  While all factors ranked the statement concerning data protection relatively high,
the statement concerning the individual’s right to privacy was ranked rather low.  Furthermore,
ensuring a public demand for a policy was seen to be unimportant, yet public engagement in the
policy-making process was ranked positively.  Such contradictions could be explained by
stakeholder values, or possibly even endemic views in the wider population, however, given the
contrast to much of the literature on impact assessments further investigation of these issues would
be prudent.
Indeed the results produced in this research indicate some interesting perceptions of the important
factors to assess when implementing ABC technology.  Further research could focus on a method to
simplify and give the statements more context in order to reduce the amount of background
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knowledge needed to perform the sorting process.  This would also allow a wider participant sample
to be selected, including travellers with little knowledge of the systems they use.  It is possible that
the current criteria and statements could be modified to aid in such a task.
Future research should also aim to further understand stakeholder perceptions of the relevant issues
to consider when assessing border control technologies such as ABC.  It may very well be the case
that further stakeholder perceptions are identified, or that the three factors presented here are
clarified.  Additionally, further research should be performed to harmonise the criteria developed
here with additional tools such as Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Reduction Assessments.  By
doing so, a more comprehensive view of impacts will be gained, potentially leading to greater
benefits for all stakeholders.
The FastPass project and future projects focusing on border technologies may benefit from the
current results by understanding the relative importance of certain issues surrounding ABC
implementation.  For example, the positive emphasis on data protection, but a low importance on
issues of public demand.  Projects could also benefit by understanding the particular areas of focus
of the factors identified here in order to understand which stakeholders might need to be consulted
about improving certain aspects of the technology in question.  For example, the results could be
used to develop minimum acceptable thresholds for certain criteria, although this should be used as
an estimate only.  It may also be useful to notice the bias of participants towards Factor 1, which
demonstrates the importance of including experts on social and ethical issues in such projects.
Understanding that such differences in opinion exist is important, but perhaps of greater importance
is an understanding of to what extent the factors differ, both in terms of perception and number of
stakeholders.
The results of this research demonstrate the importance of engaging a wide range of actors when
assessing technology.  This becomes even more important when considering the impacts of
surveillance and security technologies on society.  Although areas of international relations and
peace studies were not explicitly described in this thesis, the results of this research do indeed point
to the interaction of the state and the citizen, and also state and state.  The bordering process is
inherently discriminatory, that is, the aim of the process is to ascertain who is and is not allowed to
cross from one space into another.  The increasing use of technology allows such tasks to be
performed in new and innovative ways, yet it must still be considered how these new methods
might impact individual users, and also society in general.
Recent and upcoming proposals in the European Union place a heavy emphasis on self-service
technologies to enable accelerated and more-efficient border crossing process.  With an ever-
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increasing focus on automated technology systems to assist the border crossing process, it is
increasingly vital that implementers and developers understand the impacts of these technologies.
In an attempt to increase the understanding of these impacts, this thesis aimed at creating a set of
criteria to assess border control technologies, specifically ABC technology.  It must be repeated that
these criteria are not designed as a stand-alone tool, nor should they be utilised in a rushed check-
box process of superficial assessments.  Rather, they are designed to be incorporated with other
tools such as Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Reduction Assessments to provide a more holistic
analysis.  Additionally, this criteria set could very well be modified to assess other relevant border
control technologies, so long as due care is taken to assess whether the criteria are relevant, or
whether some minor additions or subtractions are in order.  Furthermore, this research places a
strong emphasis on the involvement of multiple stakeholders representing a wide range of
perspectives.  Such processes are intended to open dialogue about the potential impacts of the
technology on the widest range of society.  The process should involve negotiations and
renegotiations between all of the actors to ensure negative impacts are reduced as far as possible.
Only when technology assessments are performed in such a way can the results truly benefit society
as a whole.
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Appendix A. Factor Q Sort Values for each statement
# Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1
It must be considered whether technology is the best option available, and has been rigorously tested to ensure it
addresses the problem adequately,  to the requirements of the implementer, and be proven more effective or efficient
than existing, or alternative technologies.
+4 -1 -4
2
It is important that the technology's purpose and scope of use  be clearly defined  by implementers in order to clarify
what the technology will be used for, what kind of information will be gathered from whom, and who will own and
have access to this information.
+4 +2 -1
3
It is important to take the issue of respect for freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, expression and information
into account when assessing the impact of technology. -3 +1 +2
4 The technology should be attractive, ergonomic, intuitive and easy to use for all user groups (operators, end users),preferably utilising universal user interfaces, symbols and guidance. +3 -3 +4
5
It is wise to consider whether an implementation respects: the rights for a citizen to be heard before any adverse
decision is taken, the obligation for the administration to give a reason for its decision, and the citizen's right to an
effective remedy.
0 -2 +4
6 The conformity of the technology to relevant compliance standards and certifications (health and safety, security,
environment, privacy, technical etc.) is important to assess.
+2 +1 +1
7
The technology should be secure in order to prevent tampering or manipulation by unauthorised users and operators,
including hacking, tailgating, trespassing, spoofing etc. +4 -2 +1
8 In my view it is important that specific groups of individuals (e.g. children, women, elderly, unemployed, or ethnic,religious or linguistic minorities), firms or other organisations are not unreasonably affected more than others. -1 -2 +2
9
For competitive reasons, or in the interests of protecting intellectual property, or security at least some of the
components or processes of the technology need not be subject to an impact assessment if they involve sensitive or
secretive components or processes.
-3 -4 0
10 It is wise to consider whether the technology implementation has an impact on the number and quality of availablejobs. -3 0 +3
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11 It is wise to assess whether the technology has a negative social, cultural or economic impact on individuals in third
countries.
-4 +1 +1
12
The policy should be assessed in order to identify substantial changes in perceived (person feeling secure) and
objective (assessed) security of relevant stakeholders. -1 +2 +3
13 It is wise to ensure the technology is robust enough to handle the expected throughput, environmental and operationalconditions in which it will operate for a minimum of 5 years. +1 -3 -2
14 It is wise to identify whether the technology implementation and policy supports or undermines democratic
participation or national political culture.
-3 +3 -3
15
Potential hazards or harms (physical or psychological) that the technology may pose to society, individuals, or the
environment are important to assess. 0 +4 -1
16 The tendering process should be clearly defined and state the roles and expectations of the implementer and thetechnology providers, including ownership, maintenance and supply of hardware, software, data and services. 0 -4 0
17 It is crucial to assess new and innovative  technologies to identify areas in which they lack according to law, regulation,standards, or best practices. +2 -1 -3
18
The policy behind implementation, and the technology's effects on users and their behaviour should be morally
defendable; the specific technology systems and processes implemented should be proportional and acceptable to
addressing the problem; and the results of these efforts should be justifiable.
0 +4 -1
19 Technology developers are the best actors to ensure their products are compatible with existing laws and ethical norms
from conception to the final stages of production and implementation.
-4 -3 -2
20
In my view, a technology implementation, and associated processes, should abide by the right to respect for private and
family life, home and communications. -1 0 0
21
Where the technology involves user (public) interaction, the user should be given the opportunity to provide  informed
consent on whether they allow their data to be used for the explicitly stated purpose.  Alternatives should be offered to
those who do not consent.
-1 -1 -4
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22
Potential risks of  'function creep', whereby an authority approves the use of the technology, system, or data  for
additional purposes other than those which were originally stated and considered socially, ethically and legally
acceptable, are essential to clearly identify and prevent.
-1 +2 +1
23 It is essential to ensure the technology meets an extremely high level of operational availability, and fall-back options
are developed to deal with any unexpected unavailability.
+4 0 4
24
It is necessary to consider how, and what personal data is gathered, stored and transmitted by the technology, and
whether this is according to regulations pertaining to the protection of data; and whether individuals will have the right
of access and rectification of data.
+3 +4 +2
25 The policy should be proportional and necessary for addressing the problem. + +1 -3
26
It is important to consider issues regarding how a technology or policy respects the rights of equality, including non-
discrimination (on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, language, religion, political opinion, minority
group affiliation, sexual orientation and so forth), as well as respecting cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, the
rights of the child, the elderly and the disabled.
+1 -1 +3
27
It is important that the rationale behind the technology implementation, and its function and estimated costs be clearly
stated and be open for public scrutiny. -2 +1 -1
28 The impact of the technology on the natural environment should be considered. -4 0 -4
29
It is important that the technology is flexible enough to adapt to legislation changes, and to target use by the largest
possible traveller cohort:  accommodating ID card holders, partnership arrangements with other countries, minors, visa
holders, residents, and multiple biometrics etc.
+3 -3 0
30
It would be wise to assess the proposed technology investment to identify any foreseeable positive or negative effects
that it may cause that affect non-involved third parties (environment, business, supply chain, increased perceived
security etc.).
-2 -1 -4
31
It is wise for authorities to allow the public an opportunity to comment, criticise or request clarification about the
technology implementation/policy. -2 +3 +2
32
In my view, it is important that the right to respect and protect human dignity, the right to the integrity of the person,
including the level of vulnerability of the user are considered when considering a technology implementation. +2 +3 -1
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33 It is wise to consider whether the technology and its operation/procedures are in conformity to relevant national, EU,
and international laws.
+3 +4 +1
34
Before a policy is implemented it is best to assess if there is a clear public demand and need for the implementation of
the proposed technology/ies, or whether this is a political solution to a political problem. -2 -2 -2
35 It is important that the technology (Hardware and software) is easily upgradeable or adaptable in order to remain 'stateof the art'. +2 -4 +3
36 It would be wise to assess whether technologies might have a negative impact on the social cohesion and solidarity of
members of society.
-4 +3 0
37
A vital aspect of assessing the technology is whether it has been developed using the 'privacy-by-design' principle:  the
privacy of the individual is considered essential, and is integrated into the system design process from concept planning
through to the final product.
+1 +2 +4
38 It is important to ensure a clear accountability structure exists which includes who is responsible for the assessing,
implementation, proper functioning, and also for failures of the technology.
+1 0 0
39
It would be wise to ensure the technology is assessed on a cost basis (of purchase, operation, personnel, maintenance,
availability of parts and services, side costs, lock-in effects etc.) to ensure that value for money is being received over
the product lifetime.
0 -4 -2
40
Identifying and minimising how the technology could possibly be used for negative purposes other than those for
which it was designed and implemented is essential. 0 0 -3
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Appendix B. PESTL categorisation
Cat. S
#
Short name (criteria) Statement
Po
lic
y
2 Definition of purpose
It is important that the technology's purpose and scope of use  be clearly defined  by implementers in order to
clarify what the technology will be used for, what kind of information will be gathered from whom, and who will
own and have access to this information.
16 Procurement The tendering process should be clearly defined and state the roles and expectations of the implementer and the
technology providers, including ownership, maintenance and supply of hardware, software, data and services.
18
Defendable, proportional,
acceptable, justifiable.
The policy behind implementation, and the technology's effects on users and their behaviour should be morally
defendable; the specific technology systems and processes implemented should be proportional and acceptable to
addressing the problem; and the results of these efforts should be justifiable.
22 Function Creep
Potential risks of  'function creep', whereby an authority approves the use of the technology, system, or data  for
additional purposes other than those which were originally stated and considered socially, ethically and legally
acceptable, are essential to clearly identify and prevent.
25 Proportionality and necessity The policy should be proportional and necessary for addressing the problem.
27 Transparency It is important that the  rationale behind the technology implementation, and its function and estimated costs  beclearly stated and be open for public scrutiny.
31 Public Engagement It is wise for authorities to allow the public an opportunity to comment, criticise or request clarification about the
technology implementation/policy.
34 Demand
Before a policy is implemented it is best if there is a clear public demand and need for the implementation of the
proposed technology/ies, or whether this is a political solution to a political problem.
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E
th
ic
s
3 Freedoms
It is important to take the issue of respect for freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, expression and
information into account when assessing the impact of technology.
5 Administration
It is wise to consider whether an implementation respects: the rights for a citizen to be heard before any adverse
decision is taken, the obligation for the administration to give a reason for its decision, and the citizen's right to
an effective remedy.
9 Secrecy
For competitive reasons, or in the interests of protecting intellectual property, or security at least some of the
components or processes of the technology need not be subject to an impact assessment if they involve sensitive
or secretive components or processes.
11 Third Country impact It is wise to assess whether the technology has a negative social, cultural or economic impact on individuals inthird countries.
19 Responsible Technology Technology developers are the best actors to ensure their products are compatible with existing laws and ethicalnorms from conception to the final stages of production and implementation.
20 Privacy In my view, a technology implementation, and associated processes, should abide by the right to respect forprivate and family life, home and communications.
26 Equality
It is important to consider issues regarding how a technology or policy respects the rights of equality, including
non-discrimination (on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, language, religion, political opinion,
minority group affiliation, sexual orientation and so forth), as well as respecting cultural, religious and linguistic
diversity,  the rights of the child, the elderly and the disabled.
32 Dignity and Integrity
In my view it is important that the right to respect and protect human dignity, the right to the integrity of the
person, including the level of vulnerability of the user  are considered when considering a technology
implementation.
37 Privacy by design
A vital aspect of assessing the technology is whether it has been developed using the 'privacy-by-design'
principle:  the privacy of the individual is considered essential, and is integrated into the system design process
from concept planning through to the final product.
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So
ci
et
y
8 Addressee
In my view it is important that specific groups of individuals (e.g. children, women, elderly, unemployed, or
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities), firms or other organisations are not unreasonably affected more than
others.
10 Employment
It is wise to consider whether the technology implementation has an impact on the number and quality of
available jobs.
12 Security Gain or Loss The policy should be assessed in order to identify substantial changes in perceived (person feeling secure) andobjective (assessed) security of relevant stakeholders.
14 Politics/democracy It is wise to identify whether the technology implementation and policy supports or undermines democratic
participation or national political culture
15 Hazards
Potential hazards or harms (physical or psychological) that the technology may pose to society, individuals, or
the environment are important to assess.
28 Environment The impact of the technology on the natural environment should be considered.
30 Externalised effects
It would be wise to assess the proposed technology investment  to identify any foreseeable positive or negative
effects that it may cause that affect non-involved third parties (environment, business, supply chain, increased
perceived security etc.)
36 Solidarity
It would be wise to assess whether technologies might have a negative impact on the social cohesion and
solidarity of members of society.
40 Misuse Identifying and minimising how the technology could possibly be used for negative purposes other than those forwhich it was designed and implemented is essential.
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 1 Applicability
It must be considered whether technology is the best option available, and has been rigorously tested to ensure it
addresses the problem adequately,  to the requirements of the implementer, and be proven more effective or
efficient  than existing, or alternative technologies.
4 Usability The technology should be attractive, ergonomic, intuitive and easy to use for all user groups (operators, end
users), preferably utilising universal user interfaces, symbols and guidance.
7 Security
The technology should be secure in order to prevent tampering or manipulation by unauthorised users and
operators, including hacking, tailgating, trespassing, spoofing etc.
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13 Robustness
It is wise to ensure the technology is robust enough to handle the expected throughput, environmental and
operational conditions in which it will operate for a minimum of 5 years.
23 Availability/reliability It is essential to ensure the technology meets an extremely high level of operational availability, and fall-backoptions are developed to deal with any unexpected unavailability.
29 Flexibility
It is important that the technology is flexible enough to adapt to legislation changes, and to target use by the
largest possible traveller cohort:  accommodating ID card holders, partnership arrangements with other countries,
minors, visa holders, residents, and multiple biometrics etc.
35 Adaptability It is important that the technology (Hardware and software) is easily upgradeable or adaptable in order to remain'state of the art'.
39 Cost effectiveness
It would be wise to ensure the technology is assessed on a cost basis (of purchase, operation, personnel,
maintenance, availability of parts and services, side costs, lock-in effects etc.) to ensure that value for money is
being received over the product lifetime.
L
eg
al
38 Accountability It is important to ensure a clear accountability structure exists which includes who is responsible for theassessing, implementation, proper functioning, and also for failures of the technology.
6 Standardisation andcertification
The conformity of the technology to relevant compliance standards and certifications (health and safety, security,
environment, privacy, technical etc.) is important to assess.
17 Innovativeness and
compliance
It is crucial to assess new and innovative technologies to identify areas in which they lack according to law,
regulation, standards, or best practices.
21 Consent
Where the technology involves user (public) interaction, the user should be given the opportunity to provide
informed consent on whether they allow their data to be used for the explicitly stated purpose.  Alternatives
should be offered to those who do not consent.
24 Data Protection
It is necessary to consider how, and what personal data is gathered, stored and transmitted by the technology, and
whether this is according to regulations pertaining to the protection of data; and whether individuals will have the
right of access and rectification of data.
33 Legislation
It is wise to consider whether the technology and its operation/procedures are in conformity to relevant national,
EU, and international laws.
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Appendix C. HTMLQ: initial setup and customisation
The Q sorting tool HTMLQ is a HTML5 version of FlashQ, a now outdated Q sorting tool that runs
on the Flash multimedia and software program.  HTMLQ was chosen as it has a number of benefits
over FlashQ, the major one being that FlashQ does not seem to have been updated since 2007
(Hackert & Braehler 2007), and due to the fact that version of Flash had a number of known
vulnerabilities (Adobe 2007).  HTMLQ is based on the FlashQ code with only a few minor
differences in functionality, namely the ability to function on Apple operating systems that do not
utilise Flash (Approxima 2015).  HTMLQ is available for anybody to use free on an Open Source
licence and is distributed by “aproxima (sic) Gesellschaft für Markt- und Sozialforschung Weimar”
(Society for Marketing and Social Research Weimar) (2015).
To begin, the .zip file containing the application was downloaded from approxima’s (2015) GitHub
page.  There are two main ways of running HTMLQ, firstly the Offline version allows participants
to complete questionnaires and return them via email, but it also requires the entire .zip package to
be emailed out to participants.  Secondly, if HTMLQ is hosted online, the participants can login and
complete the questionnaire without the need to download anything, and the results are stored on the
server, or emailed directly to the researcher. This research utilised the online method and thus the
FlashQ PHP backend files were also downloaded.
Next the four main .xml files were located and edited as needed.  These files consist of the main
components of the ‘web site’ the language, the amount and text in the information panels, cards and
instructions, as well as the configuration of the sorting map.  For example, to change the amount of
cells for sorting distribution to reflect the number of statements (40 in this case) the map.xml file
was opened and edited in the following way:
· four extra ‘column id’ lines were added to make the new total 9
· the “column ids” were changed from -2, -1, 0, +1, +2 to -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4
· the number of rows in the columns (left to right) was changed from 2, 3, 4, 3, 2, to 4, 4, 4, 5,
6, 5, 4, 4, 4
· the colour scale was changed to show more of a sliding scale using the hex colour codes.
The original file used the same red/pink for all the negative columns, and green for the
positives.  The final version has the original pink/green on the outermost columns and
gradually lighter shades towards the centre.
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Table 11: Comparison of original and edited files
Original file Final file
<map version="1.0" htmlParse="false">
  <column id="-2" colour="FFD5D5">2</column>
  <column id="-1" colour="FFD5D5">3</column>
  <column id=" 0" colour="E9E9E9">4</column>
  <column id="+1" colour="9FDFBF">3</column>
  <column id="+2" colour="9FDFBF">2</column>
</map>
<map version="1.0" htmlParse="false">
  <column id="-4" colour="FFBABA">4</column>
  <column id="-3" colour="ffcccc">4</column>
  <column id="-2" colour="FFD9D9">4</column>
  <column id="-1" colour="FFE5E4">5</column>
  <column id="0" colour="E9E9E9">6</column>
  <column id="+1" colour="d9f2e6">5</column>
  <column id="+2" colour="c6ecd9">4</column>
  <column id="+3" colour="b3e6cc">4</column>
  <column id="+4" colour="9FDFBF">4</column>
</map>
Original "map.xml" file on left, edited file on right.
The config.xml file contains some of the operating code for the application.  In this file one can
change the order of steps in the questionnaire, or even turn some of them off altogether.  This file
also contains the code for the participant information section.  Thus to add, remove or edit which
questions the participants see after they have finished the sort on edits this document.
The language.xml file contains all of the text in the document which could possibly be translated,
such as the information and instructions given before, during and after each step, and also the text
on the different buttons.  In order to modify the instructions to reflect the fact that the Q sort now
consisted of seven columns, I changed the text:
Take the cards from the "AGREE"-pile and read them again. You can scroll through the
statements by using the scroll bar. Next, select the two statements you most agree with and
place them on right side of the score sheet below the "+2".
To the following:
Take the cards from the "Most Important"-pile and read them again. You can scroll through the
statements by using the scroll bar. Next, select the statements you most agree with and place
them on the right side of the score sheet below the "+4".
The language file also contains the section where one can choose the data transmission mode.  The
options given are sending the data via email, or automatic data transfer to the server.  For this
research the data was stored on the server.
The final file is the statements.xml file which stores the statements the researcher wants sorted by
participants.  The statements are given an id, which is then followed by the statement itself and
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capped by the end statement markers: “<statement id="1">Public transport is often
crowded</statement>”.  Statement two would begin with “<statement id="2">” and so forth.
The entering of data took numerous hours of work, especially as there were issues with the server
storage space and getting the right information for the automatic data storage actions.  The server
space was made available by the IT department at VTT using Apache, but I was responsible for
transferring all of the content myself and double-checking that the questionnaire was operating
correctly.  To perform the transfer of files from my computer to the remote server I utilised the tools
putty.exe12 which is an ssh client, and WinSCP13, an SFTP/FTP client which adds a nice user
interface to allow easy transferral of content from my local drive to the remote server.  These tools,
what they do and how they work are a mystery to me as I have very little background in IT.  They
were, however an important part of organising the online questionnaire, and as such deserve an
honourable mention.
12 The putty ssh and telnet client can be downloaded from http://www.putty.org/
13 The WinSCP FTP client can be downloaded from https://winscp.net/eng/index.php
